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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE 
COURT’S CASE LAW POST CRISIS: AN EXAMPLE FROM 
TAX LAW AND THE INTERNAL MARKET 
Katerina Pantazatou*
Summary: This paper investigates whether the ‘Euro crisis’ has al-
tered the Court of Justice’s legal reasoning in the area of the four 
freedoms and direct taxation. In view of the tremendous budgetary 
implications of the Court’s judgments in the area of direct taxation, 
this paper departs from the hypothesis that the financial crisis could 
result in the adoption of a more ‘lenient’ approach by the Court to-
wards the Member States’ national budgets (in particular those under 
financial assistance). By deploying three different indicators, the in-
terpretation and use of the general principles of EU law, the limitation 
of the temporal effects of the judgment, and the number of references 
for preliminary rulings, this paper concludes that the Court has not 
been as affected by the financial crisis as initially suspected. 
1. Introduction 
The goal of this paper is to research the case law of the Court of Ju-
stice in the area of (direct) taxation and the internal market in the ‘after-
math’ of the economic crisis. It aims to investigate whether the so-called 
‘Euro crisis’1 has somehow contributed to the evolution of the four free-
doms and direct taxation case law of the Court, in particular with regard 
to the interpretative tools the Court uses and the meaning it attaches to 
the general principles of EU law.
Given that the Court’s judgments in the area of direct taxation have, 
very often, tremendous budgetary implications for the Member States 
which are, hence, coerced to change their tax systems, the paper wishes 
to explore whether the present economic crisis has compelled the Court 
to take into account (more than it usually does) economic considerati-
ons, especially when the amounts at stake are very high. If we accept 
that the Court of Justice often engages in policy making and assumes a 
*  PhD European University Institute. I would like to thank the participants of the Workshop 
organised by the Jean Monnet Chair of European Public Law, University of Zagreb, Faculty of 
Law: ‘Internal Market in the Time of Economic Crisis - Restrictions and   Justifications’, and 
two anonymous referees for very useful comments on a preliminary version of this paper.
1  The term ‘Euro crisis’ is used to describe the situation that erupted in autumn 2008 with 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers and soon spread to the EU. It encompasses all the different 
terms used to elucidate the present multiple crises the EU is suffering from: financial crisis, 
economic crisis, sovereign debt crisis, legitimacy crisis, crisis of democracy and accountability.
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political role, we could reasonably hypothesise that the economic crisis 
would have the effect that the Court in these difficult times is trying to 
safeguard the Member States’ budgets / public finance in order to avoid 
any further need for borrowing, further damage to national budgets and 
to ensure the recovery of the most affected countries and the repayment 
of their debts, by adopting a more ‘lenient’ approach towards the Member 
States and their national budgets.
2. The CJEU’s role in national budgetary policies
It is evident that the CJEU judgments can have a significant, if not 
tremendous, impact on the budgets of the Member States.2 The budge-
tary consequences of the judgments delivered by the Court in the field 
of taxation have been the subject of discussion at the political level,3 
which has allegedly triggered a shift in the Court’s approach in the adju-
dication of direct taxation cases.4 Indicatively, the Bosal judgment5 cost 
the Netherlands €1.2 billion per year between 2003 and 2010, and had 
the outcome of the Marks and Spencer6 judgment been different, several 
Member States would have been forced to change their tax rules, while 
the German government would have counted losses of approximately €30 
billion.7 Similarly, in the (first) Test Claimants FII case,8 the UK requested 
the CJEU to limit the temporal effect of its judgment, because settling 
claims arising from a British tax provision enacted in 1974 would cost 
the government an estimated £7 billion. To exemplify the numbers, the 
outcome of a ‘serious’ case of corporate income taxation could equal or 
even exceed the amount needed for the ‘bail out’ of Ireland.9 
Eventually, a decision by the CJEU on the incompatibility of a nati-
onal tax measure with one of the four freedoms affects the national bud-
2 See, however, Servaas van Thiel, ‘The Direct Income Tax Case Law of the European 
Court of Justice: Past Trends and Future Developments’ (2008) 62 Tax Law Review 145, 
186-188, who argues that the criticism that the CJEU’s decisions are very expensive and 
that they might even carry the more fundamental risk of pushing the Member States to 
decide their own socioeconomic model, is exaggerated. Van Thiel’s argument is grounded 
on the difficulty to exactly estimate the amounts at stake, the far-stretched argument about 
the implications on the social policies of the Member States and the relatively small amou-
nts compared to the state aids cases. 
3 ECOFIN Council, Press Release of the 2638th Council Meeting, February 2005, 6141/05 
and Press Release of the 2666th Council Meeting, June 2005.
4 See under subsection 4.1 the discussion on the shift in the Court’s case law in 2005, the 
same year as the discussions in the ECOFIN Council (n 3). 
5 Case C-168/01 Bosal [2003] ECR I-9409.
6 Case C-446/03 Marks and Spencer [2005] ECR I-2283.
7 See Peter Gumbel, ‘Taking the Taxman to Court’ (2005) 165(16) Time Europe (18 April). 
8 Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2006] ECR I-11753.
9 According to the official EFSF website, the total amount lent to Ireland by the EFSF 
amounts to €17.70 billion <http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/operations/index.htm> ac-
cessed 4 December 2013.
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gets in multiple ways: first of all, the Member State will have to remove 
the discriminatory provision to raise revenue, in accordance with Article 
260 TFEU, which further implies that in order to balance its budget it will 
have either to cut spending or increase revenue through other taxes.10 
The second ‘budgetary trap’ for the Member States is premised on the 
fact that the CJEU’s decisions are generally retroactive, and therefore 
the Member States are obliged to refund with interest any discriminatory 
taxes they have already collected.11 Finally, the effect of the CJEU’s deci-
sion is not limited to the defendant Member State. In contrast, a negative 
decision for the Member State might either trigger an avalanche of appe-
als or group litigation orders against other Member States, or the latter 
will pre-emptively have to adapt their laws accordingly in order to avoid 
proceedings before the Court. 
Despite the fact that, according to settled case law, justifications 
based on purely economic reasons (ie the loss of fiscal revenues) are not 
accepted by the Court,12 and despite the possible but exceptional applica-
tion of the limitation of the temporal effects of the CJEU’s judgments,13 it 
is suspected that CJEU judges always have at the back of their mind the 
huge sums at stake in direct taxation cases.14 
3. The Court’s contribution in the budgetary policies of the Member 
States
There are several possibilities for the Member States to reduce spen-
ding and ensure fiscal discipline and compliance. Notwithstanding the 
traditional15 and innovative16 economic governance measures premised 
10 Ruth Mason, ‘Made in America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test’ (2008) 
49 Boston College Law Review 1277, 1279.
11 Case C-294/99 Athinaiki Zithopiia [2001] ECR I-6797.
12 See for instance Cases C-264/96 ICI [1998] ECR I-4695, para 28; C-307/97 Saint-Goba-
in [1999] ECR I-6163, para 50.
13 See Case C-292/04 Meilicke and Others [2007] ECR I-1835 and Michael Lang, ‘Limita-
tion of the Temporal Effects of Judgments of the ECJ’ in Dennis Weber (ed), The Influence 
of European Law on Direct Taxation (Kluwer Law International 2007).
14 Of the same opinion AG Jacobs in Case C-475/03 Banca Popolare di Cremona v Agenzia 
Entrate Ufficio Cremona [2006] ECR I-9373, and Michael Lang, ‘The Marks and Spencer 
Case: The Open Issues Following the ECJ’s Final Word’ (2006) European Taxation 54, 67 
who mainly suggests that the ECJ’s decision in the Marks and Spencer case might have 
been motivated by revenue considerations. 
15 Article 125 TFEU (ex Article 103 TEC, ‘no bail out clause’), Art 126 TFEU (ex Article 104 
TEC, Excessive Deficit Procedure), Stability and Growth Pact Regulations: Council Regula-
tion (EC) 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance and co-ordination 
of budgetary positions [1997] OJ L209/1, and Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97 of 7 July 
1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
[1997] OJ L209/6.
16 See, for example, the new economic governance mechanisms: ‘Six Pack Agreement’: Re-
gulation 1175/2011 amending Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the survei-
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on the Treaty and on secondary legislation (grounded on fiscal consoli-
dation, fiscal discipline and economic surveillance measures) destined to 
safeguard balanced budgets within the EU and the EMU, this paper will 
contemplate the Court’s role and influence with reference to the Member 
States’ budgets in the context of financial crisis.
The Court has traditionally been perceived as an integration ca-
talyst17 or, with a negative connotation, an ‘integration activist’.18  In par-
ticular, in previous crises, like the empty chair crisis of 1965 and the 
oil crisis of the late 1970s, the CJEU ‘stepped in and held the construct 
together’.19 During these crises, the integrationist impetus was bestowed 
by the Court via the making of constitutional principles such as the 
doctrines of supremacy,20 direct effect,21 state liability,22 whereas in the 
late 1970s the CJEU interpreted the EC Treaty, in the free movement of 
goods context, as prohibiting not only overt discrimination – as was expli-
citly stated under the non-discrimination principle (Article 12 EC) – but 
also covert discrimination that would hinder cross-border situations.23 
llance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies 
[2011] OJ L306/12; Regulation 1177/2011 amending Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up 
and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [2011] OJ L306/33; 
Regulation 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro 
area [2011] OJ L306/1; Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks 
of the Member States [2011] OJ L306/41; Regulation 1176/2011 on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances [2011] OJ L306/25; Regulation 1174/2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area [2011] OJ 
L306/8; the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Mone-
tary Union (‘Fiscal Compact’), the European Semester, the European Stability Mechanism 
Treaty, as well as the amendment of Article 136 TFEU.
17 Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Is the European Court Running Wild?’ (1987) 12 EL Rev 3; Joseph 
HH Weiler, ‘The Court of Justice on Trial’ (1987) 24 CML Rev 555; Lord Howe of Aberavon 
‘Euro-Justice: Yes or No?’ (1996) 21 EL Rev 187; D Edward, ‘Judicial Activism: Myth or 
Reality?’ in AI Campbell and M Voyatzi (eds) Legal Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation 
of European Law: Essays in Honour of Lord Mackenzie-Stuart (Trenton Publishing 1996); 
Anthony Arnull, ‘The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A Reply to Professor Hartley’ 
(1996) 112 LQR 411. For a more general approach, see Lord Slynn, ‘The Court of Justice of 
the European Communities’ (1984) 33 ICLQ 409; Takis Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice and 
Judicial Activism’ (1996) 21 EL Rev 199.
18  Hjalte Rasmussen, On the Law and Policy of the European Court of Justice (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1986); Hjalte Rasmussen, ‘Between Self-restraint and Activism: A Judicial Policy for 
the European Court of Justice’ (1988) 13 EL Rev 28; Sir P Neill, ‘The European Court of Ju-
stice: A Case-study in Judicial Activism’ (Memorandum presented before the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the European Communities, 18th Report (1994-95) Session) 218; TC 
Hartley, ‘The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of the European 
Union’ (1996) 112  LQR 95.
19 Joseph HH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100(8) Yale Law Journal Sym-
posium: International Law 2425. 
20 See Case C- 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
21 C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 
(Van Gend en Loos).
22 Case C-6/90  Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991]  I-05357.
23 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral [1979] ECR (Cassis de Dijon); Case C-288/89 Collectieve An-
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Later, it went one step further to find ‘any restriction liable to hinder’ the 
free movement of goods incompatible with the Treaty.24
This ‘pro-integration bias’, by aiming at further economic integra-
tion, and thus, eventually, the completion of the internal market, can 
however have counter effects on the Member States’ national laws and 
in particular their tax systems. Consequently, the Court, by finding dis-
crimination where there was none, or by finding restriction in the simple 
interaction between two tax systems (or tax jurisdictions), was allowed 
to interfere in the tax policies of the Member States and strike down per-
fectly non-discriminatory tax systems. In this sense, the pro-integratio-
nist tendencies of the Court clashed severely in an effort to balance the 
internal market objective and the tax sovereignty of the Member States.
In light of the present catastrophic crisis, one could reasonably 
hypothesise that the Court would, if not reverse the integration process, 
at least slow it down. In this way, it would not create a big ‘hole’ in the 
states’ budgets, while it would allow them to develop their tax systems 
so as to raise as much revenue as possible in order to finance their bud-
gets and to ensure the recovery of the most affected countries and the 
repayment of their debts.
 In this paper I identify two possibilities where the Court can interfe-
re with or be more lenient towards the tax systems of the Member States 
(and vice versa) in a crisis framework: a) via its legal reasoning and the 
interpretation of general principles of internal market law and the su-
bsequent outcome of the judgments; and b) by allowing for a limitation 
of the temporal effects of the judgment. The last part of this paper deals 
with a third possibility, namely the potential reduction of references for 
preliminary rulings sent by the Member States to the CJEU – in an effort 
to protect their budgets. Although in this final case it does not rest upon 
the Court to decide whether or not there will be a reduction in prelimi-
nary references, it is believed that a sharp fall in preliminary references 
sent by the Member States to the Court could coerce it to adopt a more 
‘lenient’ approach towards their national tax systems. Accordingly, even 
though the Court cannot have any influence on this factor, ie the number 
of references sent, the balanced collaboration between the national and 
the Community judge could be disrupted and the Court’s reasoning co-
uld be affected by a coordinated reduction in Member States’ references.
tennevoorziening Gouda [1991] ECR I-4007.
24 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165. 
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4. Financial crisis and the Court’s legal reasoning in direct taxation cases
4.1. Pre-crisis years
The first way the Court could take into consideration the repercussi-
ons of the financial crisis on national budgets would be by appropriately 
employing its legal reasoning to interpret the four freedoms provisions in 
a way that would not lead to striking down national tax measures. Such 
a scenario would mean a return to the early ‘non-discrimination’ test, 
which would ‘catch’ only the most ‘severe’ violations with the result of 
less integration and more leeway given to Member States to set up their 
own policies. By contrast, a broad interpretation of the ‘market access 
test’ and a ‘narrow’ justifications scope would mean removing even the 
most insignificant obstacles in the internal market and would inevitably 
eliminate the Member States’ power and rights to determine their own 
national tax systems, ie their tax bases, tax rates and whether they want 
to provide relief from double taxation.25
The CJEU picked up late on direct taxation. It decided its first case 
on the compatibility of a French tax measure with the freedom of establis-
hment in 1986,26 and in the first years it considered direct taxation cases 
under a ‘strict’27 or a ‘concealed’ non-discrimination test.28 Between 1994 
and 2005, the Court spent a ‘judicially active’ period in direct taxation, 
where it applied unfettered internal market principles,29 only to return to 
‘self-restraint’ in 2005 with the D judgment.30 Until that year, around 90 
to 95% of claims against direct tax rules had been successful. Quite un-
surprisingly, quantitative analyses show that there has been an impor-
tant increase in the number of direct tax cases brought before the CJEU 
from 2005 onwards, both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of 
relative share in the total number of preliminary ruling procedures before 
the Court, the latter of which has remained relatively constant.31
25 Suzanne Kingston, ‘The Boundaries of Sovereignty: The ECJ’s Controversial Role Applying 
Internal Market Law to Direct Tax Measures’ (2006) 9 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies 299: ‘even the inalienable right of Member States to define their own tax rates could 
be caught by a very broad restrictions based approach: a high tax jurisdiction could make 
less attractive the outgoing of a secondary establishment from a low tax jurisdiction.’
26 Case C-270/83 Commission v France (‘Avoir Fiscal’) [1986] ECR 273.
27 Commission v France (n 26); Case C- 175/88 Klaus Biehl v Administration des 
contributions du Grand Duché de Luxembourg [1990] ECR I-1779.
28 See, for instance, Klaus Biehl v Administration des contributions du Grand Duché de 
Luxembourg (n 27); Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249.
29 Peter Wattel, ‘Judicial Restraint and Three Trends in the ECJ’s Direct Tax Case Law’ (2008) 
62 Tax Law Review 205; Suzanne Kingston, ‘A Light in the Darkness: Recent Developments in 
the ECJ’s Tax Jurisprudence’ (2007) 44 CML Rev, 1321, 1338; Kingston (n 25) 287, 299.
30 Case C-376/03 D [2005] ECR I-5821.
31 Mathieu Isenbaert, EC Law and the Sovereignty of the Member States in Direct Taxation 
(IBFD 2010) 768.
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By 2005, the Court had been criticised by many tax lawyers on gro-
unds that it had failed to grasp the legal and fiscal context of the ca-
ses before it, as well as to respect long-established international tax law 
principles.32 At the same time, the Court had suffered from the ‘implicit’ 
criticism of the UK, during its presidency, in the second half of 2005, 
which was, allegedly, dissatisfied with the growing number of non-dis-
criminatory tax measures which were found incompatible with the four 
freedoms.33 Both at a political and a legal level, the Court was accused of 
failing to take into account the international tax principles to the benefit 
of EU law principles and was engaging in policy-making. This criticism 
arguably contributed to the Court’s change of approach that emerged 
in 2005. From that point onwards, the Court started employing a more 
sophisticated analysis of the ‘non-discrimination’ test34 that attempted 
to better balance national tax sovereignty with the internal market free-
doms, or, put differently, revenue (Member States) against the taxpayer, 
in particular in comparison to the ‘middle’ years. The period starting in 
2005 has been characterised as ‘enlightenment’ in the Court’s case law,35 
and overall the Court was applauded for taking a more ‘prudent’ approach 
in direct taxation cases. From that point onwards, Member States started 
‘winning’ some cases, by reason of the Court’s more cautious application 
of the ‘refined non-discrimination test’ or ‘refined market access test’. 
The new ‘refined’ approach which tried to give more leeway for the 
Member States to allocate their taxing rights as they wished was based 
on a ‘restrictions’ based analysis, but with a twist. The comparability of 
situations element – inherent to the equality principle – was introduced. 
As such, the ‘new’ but not always applied test deviated from the traditio-
nal two step analysis of a strict ‘market access test’36 and it instead com-
bined the following questions: 1) are the two situations comparable? 2) is 
there a difference in treatment? 3) can this difference in treatment be ju-
stified on public interest grounds? 4) is the proportionality step satisfied?
32 See Peter Wattel, ‘Red Herrings in Direct Tax Cases before the ECJ’ (2004) 31 Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration; Philip Baker, ‘Why It Is Time for a European Tax Tribu-
nal’(2005) 16 Int’l Tax Rev; Luc Hinnekens, ‘Territoriality-Based Taxation in an Increas-
ingly Common Market and Globalizing Economy: Nightmare and Challenge of International 
Taxation in this New Age’ (1993) EC Tax Review 156-157.
33 See C Giles, ‘Britain in Drive to Curb Power of the ECJ’ Financial Times (London, 20 June 
2005); and V Houlder, ‘UK Mulls Tax Changes to Shield Revenues from EU’ Financial Times 
(London, 5 December 2004). 
34 See Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation [2006] 
ECR I-11673; Marks and Spencer (n 6); Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 8); 
Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation [2007] ECR I-2107.
35 S Kingston, ‘A Light in the Darkness: Recent Developments in the ECJ’s Tax Jurispru-
dence’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 1338.
36 The strict market access test is premised on two prongs: 1) is there a restriction? 2) is 
this restriction justified on public interest grounds? 
84 K. Pantazatou: Economic and political considerations of the Court’s case law post crisis ...
The new approach thus did not confine itself to finding an ‘obstacle’ 
in the simple interaction of two tax systems, but it demanded that the two 
situations be comparable and that they differentiate between domestic 
and cross-border situations. The ‘refined approach’ relies heavily on the 
late AG Geelhoed’s opinion in the Test Claimants case.37 AG Geelhoed’s 
opinion was of great importance as it encouraged the Court to retreat 
from the stiff restrictions based approach by making a very crucial dis-
tinction: he basically distinguished between ‘quasi restrictions’ and ‘true 
restrictions’. The former, according to the AG, arose because of the inhe-
rent differences among the national tax systems which resulted in posing 
additional administrative compliance burdens for ‘foreign’ companies, or 
in creating disparities between different national legal orders and division 
of tax jurisdictions. The quasi restrictions that emanated from the afo-
rementioned differentiations should not, in AG Geelhoed’s opinion, fall 
within the ambit of free movement provisions. In contrast, ‘true’ restricti-
ons, that is, restrictions to free movements going beyond those resulting 
inevitably from the existence of different national tax systems, should fall 
under the prohibitions in the free movement provisions, unless they are 
justified. In the terminology used above, in order to be ‘caught’ by EU law, 
disadvantageous tax treatment should follow from discrimination resul-
ting from the rules of one jurisdiction, not the disparity or division of tax 
jurisdiction between (two or more) Member States’ tax systems.38 
The distinction between quasi and true restrictions proposed by AG 
Geelhoed corresponds to the designation between an ‘overall’39 and a ‘per 
country’ approach,40 a judicial choice which can have tremendous impli-
cations for the Member States’ delimitation of taxing powers. The former 
37 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation (n 34). The case concerned a UK 
tax measure which allowed for a tax credit for the amount of ACT (Advance Corporation 
Tax) paid by the subsidiary when dividends were distributed from and in the UK. Howe-
ver, this tax credit was not available when parent companies were not resident in the UK, 
based on the fact that the non resident parent was not subject to corporate taxation in 
the UK, although it was subject to the UK’s source tax jurisdiction (fiscal territoriality). 
The Court followed AG Geelhoed’s opinion and ruled that because the domestic versus 
the ‘foreign’ parents were not in a comparable situation, Article 43 EC was not infringed. 
The Court followed a ‘discrimination’ analysis, without mentioning anywhere the notion of 
restriction
38 This idea was reiterated in AG Geelhoed’s Opinion in Case C-170/05 Denkavit Interna-
tionaal and Denkavit France [2006] ECR I-11949, para 20.
39 Under the overall approach, the national measure at issue is not defined solely on the 
basis of the domestic legal order but by the Internal Market legal order, after having taken 
into account the legal system of the ‘competing Member States’ (two levels, two competing 
Member States, overall approach). 
40 Under the per country approach, the discriminatory or restrictive character of a national 
measure is assessed exclusively with reference to the domestic tax jurisdiction (one level, 
per country approach). If a home Member State decides to exercise its tax jurisdiction with 
regard to worldwide income, it should not discriminate between domestic sourced and fo-
reign sourced income. 
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requires that tax treatment in all the Member States involved should be 
taken into account when assessing whether a restriction exists. That is, 
even if the arising obstacle is not a result of any different treatment by 
one state, but rather a result of the simple interaction of two different tax 
systems, it should be caught under the four freedoms provisions. The 
‘overall approach’ is ‘friendlier’ to the internal market and the taxpayer. 
41 So far in cases of conflicting tax jurisdictions, the Court has mostly de-
ployed the overall approach, which has been characterised as the ‘pendu-
lum of ruthless free movement precedence over jurisdictional consistent 
taxation’.42  In contrast, under the ‘per country’ approach, the existence 
of discrimination or restriction is assessed by reference to the laws of 
one Member State and, as such, restrictions that arise from the mere 
disparities between the Member States should not fall under the ambit of 
the freedoms provisions. This way, the ‘per country approach’43 indirectly 
promotes the preservation of the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States. 
Although the tax case law of the CJEU has often followed the overall 
approach when analysing measures of the home state and the per coun-
try approach with respect to the measures of the host state, it remains 
undecided as to a definite choice between the two. With this line of argu-
ment, it remains unexplained why the Court treats differently cases of 
juridical and economic double taxation and why it considers the former 
under the (friendlier to the Member State) ‘per country’ approach and 
the latter under the (friendlier to the internal market) ‘overall’ one, with 
implications for the Member States’ allocation of taxing powers.44 It re-
mains puzzling why the Court seems willing to allocate taxing competences 
between Member States and provide for relief from economic double taxa-
41 Some of the cases where the Court opted for the ‘overall approach’ are the following: 
Case C-403/03 Schempp v Finanzamt München V [2005] ECR I-6421 (upholding German 
legislation that made deductibility of maintenance payments to a former spouse conditional 
on the payments being taxed in the spouse’s country of residence); Case C-376/03 D  v 
Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst [2005] ECR I-5821 (upholding wealth tax differences due 
to differences in tax treaties); Case C-336/96 Gilly v Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-
Rhin [1998] ECR I-2793 (holding that a country of residence’s limiting of foreign tax credit 
to the domestic tax rate did not violate the EC Treaty in the context of labour income); Case 
C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR I-225; C-470/04 N [2006] ECR I-7409; Meilicke and Oth-
ers (n 13); Marks & Spencer (n 6); Case C-319/02 Manninen [2004] ECR I-7477.
42  Wattel (n 29) 205.
43 Case E-1/04 Fokus Bank ASA v The Norwegian State [2004]; Case C-35/98 Verkooijen 
[2000] ECR I-4071; Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] 
ECR I-1727; Manninen (n 41).
44 See, for instance, Case C-128/08 Damseaux [2009] ECR I-6823, where the CJEU ruled 
that, in so far as EU law does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas 
of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination of double taxation 
within the Community, Member States are not obliged to prevent the resulting juridical do-
uble taxation. It did not, however, explain why quite often the Court attempts an allocation 
of taxing rights by requiring the Member States to eliminate economic double taxation. 
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tion, whereas it renounces its competence with regard to juridical double 
taxation, as if the former was much more detrimental than the latter.45  
4.2.  ‘Crisis’ case law 
The crisis broke out in 2008.46 Since then, the Court has decided 
at least 60 cases on direct taxation, most of them under the procedure 
of references for preliminary rulings (Art 267 TFEU). This section seeks 
to study whether the CJEU has followed the previously developed model 
of a more lenient, ‘refined’ approach in its later judgments, or a ‘broad 
justifications’ approach that would allow the Member States to maintain 
their tax systems and save their budgets. In other words, this part will 
attempt to examine whether a shift in the Court’s reasoning and inter-
pretation of general principles can be observed since 2008, in the area of 
direct taxation, similar to the one monitored in 2005. The inconsistent 
case law so far, the malleable nature of certain principles, in particular in 
the area of taxation, as well as the serious repercussions on the Member 
States’ budgets, would suggest that the Court would resort to ‘friendlier’ 
judgments for the Member States as a result of the crisis.  
What, however, can first be observed with certainty about both the 
‘pre-’ and ‘post’ crisis case law of the Court on direct taxation is that no 
patterns can be drawn. Along the lines of the pre-crisis case law, in the 
post-crisis era the Court remains undecided as to which test to apply and 
as a result it often totters between a non-discrimination, market access 
test, and a ‘refined test’, between an ‘overall’ and a ‘per country’ approach 
and different tests for the establishment of comparability. In addition, it 
has not yet adequately clarified intolerably vague concepts, like the ju-
stifications of fiscal coherence, the balanced allocation of taxing powers 
and the difference between the two, an omission that allows the Court 
to make instrumental use of justifications so as to direct accordingly the 
outcomes of the judgments. While the lines between these concepts re-
main blurred, what can be argued with certainty is that the Court has not 
returned to the ‘dark ages’ of the unfettered market access test, when al-
most all national tax measures were found incompatible with EU law. In-
stead, the increased tendency of the Court to find the national measures 
at issue compatible with EU law can be observed, via either the ‘refined 
approach’ or a broad understanding and/or instrumental use of justifica-
tions or a very relaxed proportionality test. Consequently, by persistently 
45 Joachim Englisch, ‘Taxation of Cross Border Dividends and EC Fundamental Free-
doms’ (2010) 38 Intertax 197, 203; Daniel Smit, ‘The Haribo and Oesterresichische Sa-
linen Cases: To What Extent is the ECJ Willing to Remove International Double Taxation 
Caused by Member States?’ (2011) 51 European Taxation.
46 For the purposes of this paper, the outbreak of the crisis (financial, fiscal, sovereign 
debt) is placed in the autumn of 2008 after the collapse of Lehmann Brothers.
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deploying a comparability test even in its ‘restrictions’ analysis, it seems 
that the Court founds its analysis on the ‘state-friendlier’ non-discrimi-
nation test between cross-border and purely national activities that are 
carried out within the boundaries of one and the same Member State. 47
The recent case law of the CJEU on direct taxation has mostly dealt 
with issues on dividends’ taxation and double taxation,48 group relief49 
and exit taxation.50 The divergence of the existing trends will be demon-
strated via a brief comparative analysis of the treatment of losses from 
a tax perspective by the CJEU, as well as dividends taxation and double 
taxation. This comparative analysis – built around two direct taxation 
case studies – aims to identify whether the Court has deployed the ‘frien-
dlier’ to the Member States non-discrimination test, or at least elements 
of this test, such as the need to compare two situations before esta-
blishing a ‘discriminatory restriction’, whether the scope of justifications 
has been broadened and whether the proportionality test standards have 
been lowered. The section will conclude with an assessment of the findin-
gs and an evaluation of the Court’s most recent reasoning by reference to 
the national tax laws and national budgets.  
4.2.1. Group relief cases 
The relief of groups of companies in cases of cross-border taxation re-
mains a major, still unresolved, problem before the CJEU. Normally, the 
various forms of group taxation aim at attaining tax neutrality51 between 
holdings with various subsidiaries or branches in other Member States. 
Such neutrality in modern tax systems is usually achieved through gro-
up taxation systems, amongst which the most popular are group relief 
and group consolidation.52
47 Englisch (n 45) 203.
48 Case C-194/06 Orange European Smallcap Fund [2008] ECR I-0000; Case C-303/07 
Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha [2009] ECR I-0000; Joined Cases C-436/08 and 
C-437/08 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen [2011] ECR I–305; 
Case C-310/09 Accor [2011] ECR I-0000; Case C-35/11 Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation [2012] ECR I-0000; Case C-168/11 Beker [2013] (nyr).
49 Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell [2008] ECR I-1129; Case C-414/06 Lidl Belgium [2008] 
ECR I-0000; Case C-157/07 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt [2008] 
ECR I-8061; Case C-418/07 Papillon [2008] ECR I-8947; Case C-337/08 X Holding [2010] 
ECR I-0000; Case C-18/11 HMRC v Philips Electronics [2012] ECR I-0000; Case C-123/11 
A Oy [2013] (nyr).
50 Case C-371/10 National Grid Indus [2011] ECR I-0000.
51 Tax neutrality means that the tax system does not cause any distortion when economic 
operators make a decision, for example where to establish or where to invest. See also Cesar 
Garcia Novoa, ‘Tax Neutrality in the Exercise of The Right of Establishment within the EU 
and the Funding of Companies’ (2010) 38 Intertax 568.
52 Adam Zalasinski, ‘ The Limits of the EC Concept of “Direct Tax Restriction on Free 
Movement Rights”, the Principles of Equality and Ability to Pay, and the Interstate Fiscal 
Equity’ (2009) 37 Intertax 282, 291.
88 K. Pantazatou: Economic and political considerations of the Court’s case law post crisis ...
The most usual problem arising with respect to group relief is that 
Member States provide for the advantage of group consolidation and gro-
up relief, ie the right of a group of companies to be treated as one com-
pany and thus shift their taxable base (profits and losses) in the most 
beneficial way (within the group). In most cases brought before the CJEU, 
this relief has been granted only to domestic groups, ie groups operating 
within the same Member State. 
In the post-2008 era, the Court has dealt several times with group-
relief cases, often following inconsistent legal reasoning. The first case to 
be decided within the period at issue was the Krankenheim case.53 The 
German measure here provided that resident companies  could  deduct 
losses  incurred  in  a foreign  permanent establishment (hereinafter: 
PE),  the  profits  of which  were exempted in Germany by virtue of a 
DTC, on condition that when the PE turned profitable in subsequent 
years, the losses deducted would be recaptured up to the amount of the 
profits made by the PE.  Austrian law, on the other hand, stipulated that 
the losses incurred by the PEs of foreign companies were deductible only 
if the company did not generate worldwide profits, the losses in question 
were determined on the basis of regular accounting and had not been 
taken into account for tax purposes during the previous tax years. Be-
cause of the two different national tax systems, Krankenheim could not 
deduct its final losses either in Germany or in Austria.
While the Court did not explicitly make a comparison between the 
two situations, it ruled that a company with a registered office in Ger-
many and a PE in Austria is in a less favourable position (hence compa-
rable) than it would have been if the PE were established in Germany. It 
thus, concluded that by reason of that difference in tax treatment, a Ger-
man company could be discouraged from carrying on its business thro-
ugh a permanent establishment situated in Austria.54 The Krankenheim 
reasoning is demonstrative of the Court’s tendency to find ‘discriminatory 
restrictions’, and thus of its new ‘refined approach’ that combines non 
discrimination meta tests, such as the comparability element, with ‘ob-
stacle reasoning’ as shown in the public interest justifications examined. 
The CJEU found the restriction justified under the resurrected fiscal 
coherence principle. The principle of fiscal cohesion mainly articulates 
that when a tax advantage is granted by a Member State to the taxpayer, 
the Member State is justified in ‘outweighing’ it by imposing a fiscal 
‘disadvantage’ (most of the time a tax levy). Similarly, in the opposite 
case, when there is no tax levy by the state (fiscal disadvantage for the 
tax payer) the latter is not obliged to grant a fiscal advantage either 
53 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt (n 49).
54 ibid paras 37-38. 
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(usually a tax allowance).55 The measure was finally found proportionate 
since the losses were reintegrated only up to the amount of the profits 
made. As such, the Court held that it was the responsibility of the sour-
ce state (the state of the PE) to allow for the loss to be utilised.56 Such 
an approach, together with the ‘revival’ of the fiscal coherence principle, 
seems to advocate a more ‘per country’ approach: the CJEU did not de-
mand that the residence state (the state of the parent company) design 
its national tax system so as to take into account the possible negative 
results arising from the particularities of legislation of another Member 
State. Accordingly, the ‘residence state’ was not demanded by the CJEU 
to allow the deduction of the foreign loss, although the other contracting 
state did not make that possible either.57 The problem, according to the 
Court, lay entirely with the source state and as such it should be for it 
to provide for loss relief. 
The second important case of the period under examination is the 
Papillon case.58 The French law at issue allowed for the possibility of 
group consolidation only if the intermediate subsidiary was French (or 
subject to corporation tax in France). By contrast, if the intermediate 
subsidiary was resident in another Member State, French law would not 
provide for the possibility of group consolidation. With regard to whether 
the measure was discriminatory,59 the Court primarily examined whether 
it could establish comparability between a French parent company hol-
ding a subsidiary in France and a French parent company holding a su-
bsidiary in another Member State. The Court held that ‘having regard to 
the objectives of the CGI (national measure) at issue in the main procee-
dings, those situations are thus objectively comparable’.60 Following the 
discrimination language, the CJEU soon shifts its analysis to a ‘restric-
tions-based’ one, reminiscent of the ‘double’ or ‘refined market-access 
test’. It thus contends that:
55 The principle had only been accepted by the Court twice in 1992 and under identical 
facts – in Case Bachmann (n 28) and in Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR 
I-305. Following the Bachmann (n 28), Manninen  (n 41) and Case C-471/04 Keller Holding 
[2006] ECR I-2107 cases,  the  Court  had  “toughened”  the  acceptance  of  the  coherence 
justification  by requiring a “direct link” between “the tax advantage concerned and the 
offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy, the direct nature of that link falling 
to be examined in the light of the objective pursued by the rules in question”. The Court 
found that this direct link existed in the Krankenheim case (n 49) since the German recap-
ture rule reflected a logical symmetry and was the complement of the deduction previously 
granted.
56 Krankenheim (n 49) para 50ff.
57 ibid para 49.
58 Papillon (n 49).
59 ibid para 27: ‘In order to establish whether discrimination exists, the comparability of a 
Community situation with one which is purely domestic must be examined by taking into 
account the objective pursued by the national provisions at issue’.
60 ibid para 30. 
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inasmuch as, from a taxation perspective, they put Community situ-
ations at a disadvantage compared with purely domestic situations, 
the provisions of the CGI at issue in the main proceedings thus con-
stitute a restriction which is, in principle, prohibited by the provisi-
ons of the Treaty relating to the freedom of establishment. 
This kind of analysis allows the Court to resort to a wide range of 
justifications, after, however, it has established the discrimination ‘mi-
nimum standard’ of comparability. With regard to the justification, the 
Court rejected in first place the preservation of a balanced allocation of 
taxing powers as a valid argument on the self-evident fact that all the 
companies that sought to be included in the consolidation regime were 
resident in the same Member State.61 It contrasted this case to the Oy 
AA62 and the Marks & Spencer63 cases where indeed the losses were re-
corded in a Member State other than that in which the taxpayer was re-
sident and hence the interaction of different tax jurisdictions involved the 
risk of tax avoidance. The Court, nevertheless, found the national legi-
slation justifiable on grounds of the need to preserve the coherence of 
the tax system, proving its willingness to re-examine its stance towards 
this until recently neglected justification. The Court identified the direct 
link needed in the fact that the neutralisation of intra-group transacti-
ons avoided, inter alia, the possibility of losses being used twice at the 
level of the resident companies under the tax integration regime. The 
CJEU found that the French consolidation system, nevertheless, went 
beyond what was necessary to ensure the coherence of the tax system 
and thus failed the proportionality test, on the grounds that pursuant to 
the Mutual Assistance Directive64 the Member States were allowed and 
encouraged to exchange information that would enhance transparency in 
cross-border transfers. 
The X-Holding case65 attempted to answer the question of whether a 
Dutch measure giving the possibility of consolidation only when all the 
‘parts’ of the group of companies fell under the Dutch fiscal jurisdiction 
was compatible with EU law. Along the lines established in the earlier 
judgments, the Court commenced its analysis by examining whether the 
situation between a resident parent wishing to form a single tax entity 
with a resident subsidiary was comparable to the situation of a resident 
61 ibid paras 37-40.
62 Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR I-6373.
63 Marks & Spencer (n 6).
64 Council Directive (EU) 2011/16 of 15 February 2011 on the administrative cooperation 
in the field of taxation and repealing Council Directive (EEC) 77/799 of 19 December 1977 
on the mutual assistance by the competent authorities of Member States in the field of di-
rect taxation and taxation of insurance premiums.
65 Case C-337/08 X Holding [2010] ECR I-1215.
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parent wishing to form a single tax entity with a non resident subsidiary. 
The CJEU ruled that the two situations were objectively comparable with 
regard to ‘the objective of a tax scheme such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings in so far as each seeks to benefit from the advantages of that 
scheme’,66 which, in particular, ‘allows the profits and losses of the com-
panies constituting the single tax entity to be consolidated at the level of 
the parent company and the transactions carried out within the group to 
remain neutral for tax purposes.’67 Once it had established comparabi-
lity, and hence a difference in treatment, the Court proceeded to examine 
whether this discriminatory treatment could be justified by overriding re-
asons in the general interest.68
At this level, the Court found that the Dutch measure was justi-
fied on the grounds of the need to safeguard the balanced allocation 
of taxing powers. The X-Holding case provides the first case where the 
‘balanced allocation of taxing powers justifications’69 ‘standing alone’ was 
successful.70 The Court justified its answer by stating that since the 
parent company was at liberty to decide to form a tax entity with its 
subsidiary and, with equal liberty, to dissolve such an entity from one 
year to the next, ‘ the possibility of including a non-resident subsidiary 
in the single tax entity would be tantamount to granting the parent 
company the freedom to choose the tax scheme applicable to the lo-
sses of that subsidiary and the place where those losses are taken into 
account.’71 After passing the ‘justifications’ test, the Dutch rule succe-
ssfully met the proportionality criteria. Quite surprisingly and similar 
to the earlier Lidl Belgium case,72 the   CJEU   rejected   the   argument 
advanced   by   the   European Commission  and  the  plaintiff  about the 
existence of a  less  restrictive  measure  based on a deduction recaptu-
66 The far-reaching implications of the objective used to establish comparability used there-
in did not escape criticism. Indeed, as Weber has pointed out, if a situation is comparable 
as long as you try to benefit from the domestic advantages that means that you are always 
in a comparable situation. See D Weber, Refusal of Advantage of a Cross-Border Tax Con-
solidation a Justified Restriction of the Freedom of Establishment (Comments by D. Weber 
on the X Holding case), (2010) 7 Highlights & Insights on European Taxation 6.
67 X Holding (n 65) para 24. 
68 ibid para 25.
69 The balanced allocation of taxing powers has been interpreted by the Court as an objec-
tive designed, inter alia, to safeguard the symmetry between the right to tax profits and the 
right to deduct losses. Lidl Belgium (n 49) para 33.
70 The justification of the ‘balanced allocation of taxing powers’ was first successfully put 
forward in Marks and Spencer (n 6), where the UK restrictive measure of the non-extension 
of group relief to non UK companies was justified on grounds of the balanced allocation of 
taxing powers, the danger of losses being used twice and the prevention of tax avoidance 
taken together. 
71 X Holding (no 65) para 31.
72 Lidl Belgium (n 49).
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re  rule73 and  it  instead   considered  the Dutch fiscal unity regime to 
be proportionate to its objective.74 The Court refused to accept that a 
recapture mechanism would be a less burdensome and still practicably 
manageable alternative to the general exclusion of foreign losses on gro-
unds that a foreign PE and a foreign subsidiary were not comparable 
with regard to the allocation of taxing powers75 and thus, with a lack of 
comparable situations, ‘the Member State of origin remains at liberty to 
determine the conditions and level of taxation for different types of esta-
blishments chosen by national companies operating abroad’.76
The Philips Electronics case77 concerned a UK measure which pro-
vided that consortium claims were restricted to UK resident companies. 
‘Foreign’ PEs were further allowed to surrender their losses only under 
the condition that it was clear that at the time of the claim there could 
never be any deduction or allowance in any other state outside the UK. 
Similar to the previous cases, the Court primarily sought to establish 
whether a non-resident company with only one PE in the UK was in a 
comparable situation to a resident company in the UK with regard to the 
possibility of transferring by means of group relief losses sustained in the 
UK to another company within the same group. It thus ruled that having 
regard to the objective of a tax regime such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings, the two situations were objectively comparable in so far as 
concerns the possibility of transferring by means of group relief losses 
sustained in the United Kingdom to another company in that group.78 
The comparability of the two situations allowed the Court to find the UK 
measure restrictive to the freedom of establishment. The measure was, 
however, not justified on any of the grounds provided by the British go-
vernment. The balanced allocation of taxing powers, the danger of the 
losses being used twice, as well as the combination of the two justifica-
tions, were rejected by the Court on grounds that in a situation like the 
one in the main proceedings 
the possibility of transferring, by means of group relief and to a re-
sident company, losses sustained by the permanent establishment 
in that Member State of a non-resident company is subject to a con-
dition that those losses cannot be used for the purposes of foreign 
taxation, while the transfer of losses sustained in that Member State 
by a resident company is not subject to any equivalent condition.79
73 X Holding (n 65) para 35.
74 ibid paras 41-42.
75 ibid para 38ff. 
76 ibid para 40.
77 Case C-18/11 HMRC v Philips Electronics [2012] ECR I-0000.
78 ibid para 19.
79 ibid para 27.
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The final relevant case within the designated time framework was 
the A Oy case.80 In principle, the Court examined whether a Finnish me-
asure that allowed resident parent companies to take into account a re-
sident subsidiary’s losses when the latter merged with another resident 
subsidiary, but not if it merged with a non-resident subsidiary, was com-
patible with the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital. 
Unlike the previous cases, however, the Court did not seek to establish 
comparability first. In contrast, it resorted to a strict obstacles’ approach, 
similar to the one it adhered to during its ‘active years’ and ruled that the 
Finnish measure was ‘liable to make establishment in the latter state less 
attractive and hence to deter the company from setting up subsidiaries 
there’.81 Following the establishment of a restriction, the Court proceeded 
to moderate the ‘stiff restrictions’ based approach it had adopted and mo-
ved the comparability test as a potential justification for this difference in 
treatment.82 Pursuant to the relatively recent conceptually flawed trend 
to use the comparability requirement as a quasi justification,83 the Court 
ruled through rather tautological reasoning that the two situations were 
objectively comparable, on the basis of the aim of the measure, which 
was intended to ‘allow the parent company to benefit from the tax advan-
tage consisting in being able to deduct from tax the losses incurred by the 
subsidiary’.84 It, however, left it to the national Court to assess whether 
the deduction from taxable income of the merged company’s losses would 
also have been refused, in the same circumstances, if the merger had 
been with a resident subsidiary, on the ground that the sole motive for 
the operation was to obtain a tax advantage.85 If that were the case, then 
no difference in treatment between resident and non-resident companies 
could be established. The Court continued by examining, along the Mar-
ks and Spencer86 lines, whether the balanced allocation of taxing rights, 
the risk of tax avoidance and the danger of losses being used twice could 
justify this ‘difference in treatment’. Following the same reasoning it had 
applied in the earlier Marks and Spencer case,87 the Court ruled that 
the Finnish measure at issue was justifiable on these three grounds ta-
80 A Oy (n 49)
81 ibid para 32.
82 ibid para 33: ‘For such a difference in treatment to be compatible with the provisions 
of the FEU Treaty on Freedom of Establishment, it must relate to situations which are not 
objectively comparable or be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest.’ 
83 See for example Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation (n 34) and Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 8); Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische 
Salinen (n 48). 
84 A Oy (n 49) para 35.
85 ibid para 36.
86 Marks and Spencer (n 6).
87 ibid.
94 K. Pantazatou: Economic and political considerations of the Court’s case law post crisis ...
ken together.88 Finally, with regard to the proportionality of the measure, 
the Court, once again, followed the Marks and Spencer pattern. It hence 
asked the national court to decide whether the non-resident subsidiary 
had exhausted the possibilities available in its state of residence of ha-
ving the losses taken into account there. 
It can be argued, from the analysis of the case law so far, that the 
Court seems to persist in the view that ‘forum shopping’ with regard to 
group losses is against the balanced allocation of taxing powers or – 
as in the Krankenheim and Papillon cases – the fiscal coherence of the 
Member States. The cases considered so far under the group relief ‘block 
of cases’ amplify the incoherent legal reasoning of the Court and its ina-
bility to provide guidelines that would allow for more legal certainty in 
this area for all the players involved.  As a starting point, we can observe 
that the revival of the coherence principle on the one hand increased the 
number of potential successful justifications put forward by the Mem-
ber States, but on the other hand it complicated even more the already 
obscure distinctions between the commonly accepted justifications (ba-
lanced allocation of taxing powers, danger of losses being used twice 
and the danger of tax avoidance). In sharp contrast to the Lidl Belgium 
judgment, which was similar on the facts, where the Court justified the 
restriction at issue on the need to maintain a balanced allocation of 
taxing powers, in the Krankenheim judgment it chose to justify the Ger-
man recapture rule under the fiscal coherence principle,89 without pro-
viding clear ‘reasons’ for such a rather ‘unjustified’ choice. In addition, it 
has been argued that in the light of the two aforementioned judgments, 
the justifications seem to become exchangeable: the two justifications 
used in the Lidl Belgium judgment, taken ‘together’ as the Marks and 
Spencer judgment required, can be replaced by the ‘magical concept’ of 
fiscal cohesion.90
4.2.2. Dividends taxation cases
One of the main problems of direct taxation is the possibility of 
the simultaneous exercise of taxing rights by two different states. This 
obstacle in the free movement of both natural and legal persons can be 
88 A Oy (n 49) para 46. 
89 See also A Cordewener, G Kofler and S Van Thiel, The Clash Between European Free-
doms and Direct Tax Law: Public Interest Defences Available to the Member States (2009) 
46 CML Rev 1974, who argue that in Lidl Belgium (n 49) the Court held that the Ger-
man refusal to allow the deduction of foreign PE losses was justified by the need to 
safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing powers and the danger of losses being used 
twice because the tax treaty allocated tax jurisdiction over the PE profits exclusively to 
the source state.
90 M Lang, Recent Case Law of the ECJ in Direct taxation: Trends, Tensions and Contradic-
tions (2009) 3 EC Tax Review 109. 
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attributed to the general particularities of direct taxation and, specifi-
cally, the lack of any allocation of taxing powers among the different 
Member States. Such a ‘double taxing jurisdiction’ might give rise to 
(economic and juridical) double taxation and the subsequent need for 
the allocation of taxing rights.91 However, it remains doubtful whether 
the Court should have the power to allocate such taxing rights in order to 
eliminate the obstacle of double taxation. While outright discriminatory 
tax measures should be eliminated, very few national tax measures are 
currently challenged before the CJEU for being prima facie directly dis-
criminatory. In contrast, the majority of the measures brought forward 
concern restrictions that emanate from the interaction of two national 
tax systems.  
The unanswered questions in the area of dividends taxation are 
akin to the compatibility of obstacles arising from the mere interaction 
of two tax systems with EU law, the different treatment of incoming 
and outbound dividends,92 the choice of the state to provide relief from 
double taxation (home – host or neither), compatibility with the Treaty 
method of relief from double taxation (without the possibility of the si-
multaneous application of both the credit and exemption methods) and 
subsequently the most desired neutrality to be achieved.93
The first 2008 ‘dividend’ case was the Aberdeen case,94 where the 
Court considered whether a Finnish measure that allowed for the exemp-
tion of withholding taxes for dividends that were distributed domestically 
91 Although the Parent Subsidiary Directive (Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 
1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and 
subsidiaries of different Member States) clearly facilitates cross-border dividend payments, 
it has to be clarified that not all cross-border dividend payments are covered by it. The 
limitations of the Parent Subsidiary Directive can be summarised by the need of the parent 
company to hold at least 10% of the shares in the subsidiary company for the exemption 
to apply and on the limited applicability to certain types of companies. Whenever national 
measures do not fall in the scope of the Directive, Member States maintain their power to 
decide whether and to what extent they want to exercise their taxing rights with respect to 
the distribution of profits. This power might cause multiple tax burdens which will arise, 
as will be explained, either by the legislation of a single national tax system which will 
be discriminating against cross-border situations or by the mere interaction between two 
different Member States’ tax systems. The problem is aggravated because of the silence 
of the Treaty regarding relief from double taxation. Article 293 TEC which stipulated that 
‘Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a 
view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: […]  the abolition of double taxation within 
the Community’, was not included in the TFEU.
92 Incoming dividends mean the dividends that leave the ‘source’ or ‘host’ state and enter 
the ‘residence’ or ‘home’ state, whereas outbound dividends mean the dividends that leave 
the ‘home’ or ‘residence’ state to enter the ‘host’ or ‘source’ state. The case resembles the 
company case law relating to the free movement to ‘enter’ and to ‘exit’. 
93 Neutrality here means either Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) or Capital Export Neutrality 
(CEN). 
94 Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha (n 48).
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was compatible with the freedom of establishment. The case concerned 
the distribution of dividends from Aberdeen, a Finland-based company, 
to a SICAV based in Luxembourg. The comparability of the given dome-
stic situation with the given cross-border one was problematic, as the 
form of a SICAV company was not recognised by Finnish legislation. 
In a seemingly desperate effort to establish comparability between the 
two cases, the Court ruled that ‘once a Member State, unilaterally or by 
way of a convention, imposes a charge to income tax not only on resi-
dent shareholders but also on non-resident shareholders in respect of 
dividends which they receive from a resident company, the position of 
those non-resident shareholders becomes comparable to that of resident 
shareholders’.95 In line with the ‘refined restrictions approach’ followed in 
most of the group relief cases, the Court primarily found a difference in 
treatment that constituted a restriction of the freedom of establishment, 
potentially justifiable under justifications based on public interest. With 
regard to the latter, the Court rejected all the prevention of tax avoidan-
ce on the grounds that the measure at issue did not specifically target 
against wholly artificial arrangements96 the balanced allocation of taxing 
powers on the grounds that ‘in so far as dividends distributed by resident 
companies are taxed in the hands of the distributing companies as pro-
fits realised, the exemption from withholding tax on those dividends does 
not deprive the Republic of Finland of all right to tax the income relating 
to activities carried out on its territory’,97 as well as the need to maintain 
the coherence of the tax system because of the lack of a direct link betwe-
en the tax and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy.98
In the Haribo case,99 the Court was called to answer whether the 
Austrian measure that provided that nationally sourced dividends were 
exempted from tax unconditionally, whereas portfolio dividends from 
EU/EEA countries could either be exempted or provided with a credit 
under certain conditions,100 was compatible with the free movement 
95 ibid  para 43. 
96 See the ‘Cadbury doctrine’, Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas [2006] ECR I-7995.
97 Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha (n 48) para 70:  ‘in so far as dividends distributed by 
resident companies are taxed in the hands of the distributing companies as profits realised, 
the exemption from withholding tax on those dividends does not deprive the Republic of 
Finland of all right to tax the income relating to activities carried out on its territory’.
98 Case C-484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson [1995] ECR I-3955, para 18; Imperial Chemi-
cal Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes) (n 12) para 
29;  Manninen  (n 41) para 42; and  Keller Holding (n 55) para 40.
99 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen (n 48).
100 Exemption for ‘foreign’ portfolio dividends would be provided if comparability to do-
mestic corporations falling within the scope of para 7(3) could be established and com-
prehensive procedures existed between Austria and EU/EEA Member States for mutual 
assistance with regard to administrative and enforcement matters, whereas credit would 
be provided if the taxpayer submitted a declaration containing information about the 
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of capital. The crucial question the Court attempted to address was 
whether the exemption and imputation methods, as methods of relief 
from double taxation, should be considered as equivalent. The Court 
ruled that the existence of an additional condition for relief rendered in-
vestment abroad less attractive, and thus the measure was restrictive of 
the free movement of capital. Similar to the A Oy case,101 the Court star-
ted its analysis by deploying an ‘obstacles-based’ analysis to review the 
comparability of situations as a quasi justification: a corporate sharehol-
der receiving foreign sourced dividends was comparable102 to a corporate 
shareholder receiving nationally sourced dividends.103 Since the two situ-
ations were deemed comparable, the restriction could only be justified on 
public interest justifications (and thus not on Article 65(1) TFEU).104 The 
Court accepted this time that both the effectiveness of fiscal supervision 
and the prevention of tax avoidance arguments were able to justify the 
restrictive measure, on the grounds that 
where the legislation of a Member State makes the grant of a tax ad-
vantage dependent on satisfying conditions compliance with which 
can be verified only by obtaining information from the competent 
authorities of a non-member State party to the EEA Agreement, it is 
in principle legitimate for the Member State to refuse to grant that 
advantage if – in particular, because that non-member State is not 
bound under an agreement to provide information – it proves im-
possible to obtain the requisite information from it (Établissements 
Rimbaud, paragraph 44).105 
company and the actual tax base and rate the company was subject to. If none of the 
aforementioned conditions applied no relief would be provided. 
101 A Oy (n 49). 
102 Note here the different distinction and opinion of AG Kokott, according to whom the situ-
ations were not comparable with regard to the method of preventing double taxation to be 
used because the unconditional exemption was not capable of guaranteeing that corporation 
tax was also levied on foreign dividends at the domestic level (para 44 of the AG’s Opinion) 
(emphasis added). Thus, Art 65(1)(a) TFEU could apply as a justification.
103 Para 59: in the context of a tax rule, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which 
seeks to prevent the economic double taxation of distributed profits, the situation of a cor-
porate shareholder receiving foreign sourced dividends is comparable to that of a corporate 
shareholder receiving nationally sourced dividends in so far as, in each case, the profits 
made are, in principle, liable to be subject to a series of charges to tax (see Test Claimants 
in the FII Group Litigation (n 8) para 62).
104 Art 65 (1) TFEU mainly stipulates that different tax treatment is allowed for taxpay-
ers who are not in the same position with regard to their place of residence and the place 
where their capital is invested.  The derogation in that provision is itself limited by Article 
65(3) TFEU, which provides that the national provisions referred to in Article 65(1) ‘shall not 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free move-
ment of capital and payments as defined in Article 63’.
105 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen (n 48) para 67.
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The Court in the Haribo case was asked to reconsider its case law 
with regard to international juridical double taxation. As expected, the 
CJEU confirmed its earlier, settled case law106 according to which ‘divi-
dends distributed by a company established in one Member State to a 
shareholder resident in another Member State are liable to be subject to 
juridical double taxation where the two Member States choose to exerci-
se their fiscal competence and to subject those dividends to taxation in 
the hands of the shareholder’ and continued by noting that ‘the Court 
has already ruled that the disadvantages which may arise from the pa-
rallel exercise of powers of taxation by different Member States, in so far 
as such an exercise is not discriminatory, do not constitute restrictions 
prohibited by the Treaty’.107 Since European Union law, as it currently 
stands, does not lay down any general criteria for the attribution of areas 
of competence between the Member States in relation to the elimination 
of double taxation within the European Union, the fact that both the 
Member State in which the dividends are paid and the Member State in 
which the shareholder is resident are liable to tax those dividends does 
not mean that the Member State of residence is obliged, under Europe-
an Union law, to prevent the disadvantages which could arise from the 
exercise of competence thus attributed by the two Member States.108 The 
Court, thus, by applying a ‘per country approach’, adhered to its settled 
distinction between economic and juridical double taxation. By answe-
ring the question of whether or not international juridical double taxation 
caused by the parallel exercise of tax competences by different Member 
States infringes the fundamental freedoms of the TFEU in the negative, 
the Court provided a regrettable outcome, at least from the perspective 
of the internal market. Such a result remains, however, understandable 
considering that, had the CJEU decided otherwise, it would have su-
bsequently had to decide which Member State would be responsible (and 
to what extent) for removing the double taxation.109 On the other hand, 
the grounds on which the CJEU maintains this distinction, as if econo-
106  Case C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres [2006] ECR I-10967, para 22; Orange European 
Smallcap Fund (n 48); Damseaux (n 44) para 33; Case C-67/08 Block [2009] ECR I-883, 
para 30; Case C-96/08 CIBA [2010] ECR I-0000, paras 27 and 28. 
107 Damseaux  (n 44) paras 26 -27.
108 Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen (n 48) paras 168-169; Case 
C-487/08 Commission v Spain [2010] ECR I-0000, paras 56 and the case law cited.
109 To this extent, see inter alia, Dennis M Weber, ‘In Search of a (New) Equilibrium Between 
Tax Sovereignty and the Freedom of Movement Within the EC’ (2006) Intertax 593. For a 
view advocating that international juridical double taxation is contrary to the fundamental 
freedoms, see Frans Vanistendael, ‘Does the ECJ have the Power of Interpretation to Build 
a Tax System Compatible with the Fundamental Freedoms?’ (2008) EC Tax Review 52, 66, 
who takes the view that obstacles resulting from double burdens caused by the cumulative 
application of disparate non-discriminatory tax rules in two different Member States also 
constitute a restriction on the free movements and thus, in principle, are incompatible with 
the fundamental freedoms. 
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mic double taxation is more detrimental to the freedoms in comparison 
to juridical double taxation, still remain puzzling.110
In the Accor case,111 France’s reference for a preliminary ruling 
asked the Court to rule on whether the provision of tax credit against 
advanced payment (ACT) upon dividend redistribution to shareholders 
when the subsidiary of the parent is established in France, but not when 
the subsidiary of the parent is in another Member State (no entitlement 
to tax credit), was contrary to EU Law. The Court considered the compa-
rability of the two situations as a potential justification and ruled, inter 
alia, that by treating nationally sourced dividends more favourably than 
foreign sourced dividends, French law introduced a difference in tre-
atment (per country approach). It specifically noted that ‘[i]t is common 
ground that the rules at issue introduce a difference in treatment between 
dividends distributed by a resident subsidiary and those distributed by a 
non resident subsidiary’112 which might dissuade a parent company ‘from 
carrying on its activities through the intermediary of subsidiaries esta-
blished in other Member States’.113 The Court found that ‘the difference 
in treatment depending on the place of establishment of the subsidiary 
distributing the dividends and the possibility of setting off any tax credit 
against the advance payment due when those dividends were redistribu-
ted, stemmed directly from the French legislation at issue in the main 
proceedings’.114 Since France did not provide for any justifications, the 
Court stopped its reasoning in simply finding a ‘discriminatory restricti-
on’ on behalf of France, by applying a ‘per country’ approach. 
 In the Test Claimants FII case,115 the UK asked the Court to elabo-
110 The Court has, on several occasions, ruled that economic double taxation infringes the 
free movements. See, for instance, Case C-315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I-7063, paras 20 to 49; 
Manninen (n 41) paras 20 to 55; and Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 8) para 46.
111 Case C-310/09 Accor SA [2011] ECR I-0000.
112 ibid para 44: It is thus clear from the case law that, whatever the mechanism adopted 
for preventing or mitigating the imposition of a series of charges to tax or economic double 
taxation, the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty preclude a Member State 
from treating foreign sourced dividends less favourably than nationally sourced dividen-
ds, unless such a difference in treatment concerns situations which are not objectively 
comparable or are justified by overriding reasons in the public interest (see, to that effect, 
Case C-315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I-7063, paras 20 to 49; Manninen (n 41) paras 20 to 55; 
and Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 8) para 46).
113 Accor SA (n 111) para 51.
114 ibid para 58.
115 Case C-35/11 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation [2012] ECR I-0000. The case 
poses questions relating to the ‘first FII case’. In the first FII case (Test Claimants in the 
FII Group Litigation (n 8)), the CJEU addressed a number of issues relating to the UK tax 
treatment of dividends received from foreign companies. A key issue was whether the UK 
was in breach of EU law by exempting dividends received from resident companies, while 
taxing dividends from comparable foreign companies, and providing a credit for underlying 
foreign tax. The CJEU held that, in principle, the UK was not in breach of EU law provided 
the foreign profits were not subject to a higher tax rate than domestic dividends. The cur-
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rate on the equivalence of the imputation and the exemption methods 
for providing relief from double taxation.116 On comparability grounds, 
the Court held that a corporate shareholder receiving foreign sourced 
dividends is comparable to a corporate shareholder receiving nationally 
sourced dividends, in so far as, in each case, the profits made are, in 
principle, liable to be subject to a series of charges to tax. As such, the 
Court continued, a need for equal treatment when providing relief from 
double taxation arose. Such equal treatment was, however, not provided, 
since nationally sourced dividends were exempted from double taxation, 
whereas foreign sourced dividends were provided with a credit.117 The 
Court applied once again the ‘refined test’ as it first researched whether 
the two situations were comparable, before it proceeded to establish a 
difference in treatment and, thus, a restriction in the free movement of 
capital and establishment.118 Along the pattern re-established pursuant 
to the Krankheim judgment, the measure was found justifiable on the 
grounds of the cohesion of the tax system, as the Court identified the 
existence of a direct link between the tax levy (the tax the distributed 
profits have already been subject to) and the tax advantage of the provi-
sion of credit and exemption. In this way, the Court found the economic 
double taxation of the distributed profits was avoided. The UK measure 
at issue failed, however, to pass the proportionally test, as it fell short of 
the necessity limb. The CJEU ruled that it was not necessary, in order to 
maintain the cohesion of the tax system in question, to take account of 
the effective level of taxation to which the distributed profits have been 
subject to calculate the tax advantage when applying the imputation met-
rent referral seeks guidance on how to interpret this exception. Another important issue 
concerned whether a UK resident company receiving dividends from a third country on the 
basis of a holding which gives the receiving company definite influence over the decisions of 
the company making the distribution falls within the scope of the free movement of capital. 
The referral also dealt with certain aspects of the UK’s former ACT regime. Because of their 
specific nature, these are not covered here.
116 A summary of the question that arose in Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 
115). The question asked, in principle, whether the fact that nationally sourced dividends 
were exempted from corporation tax whereas foreign sourced dividends were granted credit 
relief against the withholding tax paid at source contravened Arts 49 and 63 TFEU. The 
‘new’ FII referred 4 more questions to the CJEU by reference to the original case, which, in 
view of their being unrelated to the issues under consideration here, will not be presented 
in this section.
117 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 115) para 65 ‘[…] the answer to the first que-
stion is that Articles 49 TFEU and 63 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation 
of a Member State which applies the exemption method to nationally-sourced dividends 
and the imputation method to foreign-sourced dividends if it is established, first, that the 
tax credit to which the company receiving the dividends is entitled under the imputation 
method is equivalent to the amount of tax actually paid on the profits underlying the dis-
tributed dividends and, second, that the effective level of taxation of company profits in the 
Member State concerned is generally lower than the prescribed nominal rate of tax’.
118 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 115) paras 48-54. 
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hod and, on the other hand, of only the nominal rate of tax chargeable on 
the distributed profits when applying the exemption method. 119
In the Beker case,120 the referring Court’s question mainly asked 
whether it was contrary to the free movement of capital for special perso-
nal deductions to be taken into account when calculating the tax credit 
for withholding tax paid abroad.121  The German measure at issue thus 
stipulated that resident taxpayers benefited completely from the (German) 
personal and family allowances when all their income was received in Ger-
many, whereas resident taxpayers who had received part of that income 
abroad were not entitled to such complete benefits. While the CJEU did 
not explicitly consider the comparability of the two situations, it ruled that:
taxpayers resident in one Member State who have received one 
part of their revenue abroad are at a disadvantage compared with 
taxpayers resident in the same Member State who received all of the-
ir revenue in that Member State and who therefore benefit from all 
allowances corresponding to special costs and extraordinary char-
ges such as costs relating to lifestyle or to personal and family cir-
cumstances. Consequently, such a difference in treatment is likely to 
discourage persons subject to unlimited taxation in a Member State 
from investing their capital in companies having their principal place 
of business in another Member State or in a third State.122 
While the comparability element, inherent in the discrimination test, 
is only implicitly acknowledged, the case should also be classified as a 
‘refined restrictions approach’ case because of the attempt to establish 
‘difference in treatment’ before finding ‘discouragement’, ‘dissuasion’, 
‘obstacle’ or ‘restriction’. The only justification put forward by the Ger-
119 Nominal taxation is usually higher than the effective levels (higher tax base).
120 Case C-168/11 Beker [2013] (nyr).
121 As the dividend income of individuals is (partly) taxable, the foreign withholding tax 
can – in accordance with the underlying double tax treaty and Sec 34c Income Tax Act – be 
credited against the respective amount of German income tax. However, when assessing 
the respective amount of tax, special personal expenses without any link to the foreign in-
come will partly be attributed to this income. This attribution reduces the taxable foreign 
income and thus results in a  limitation of the tax credit. The referring Court’s question 
thus mainly asks whether it is contrary to the free movement of capital for special personal 
deductions to be taken into account when calculating the tax credit for withholding tax 
paid abroad. If special personal deductions were allowed to affect the tax credit, the risk of 
juridical double taxation of dividends would arise, while personal tax allowances would not 
come totally into effect. Under the conventions for the avoidance of double taxation, conclu-
ded between the Federal Republic of Germany and the States of origin of those dividends, 
it is open to that Member State, as the State of residence of the applicants in the main 
proceedings, to levy a tax on foreign dividends. In order to avoid juridical double taxation 
of those dividends, foreign withholding tax is offset against the income tax due according 
to the income tax scale, up to the level of the German income tax charged on the income 
concerned. 
122 Beker (n 120) paras 51-52.
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man government that Germany was not obliged to compensate for disad-
vantages linked to the failure to take into account the taxpayers’ personal 
circumstances during the taxation of foreign income in the source state 
was not accepted by the Court. The grounds for the Court not to accept 
this were that the taxpayer’s state of residence could not use the justi-
fication of the balanced allocation of taxing powers in order to evade its 
responsibility to grant the taxpayer the personal and family allowances 
to which he is entitled, unless, of their own accord or as a consequence 
of specific international agreements, the states in which one part of the 
income is received grant such allowances.123 
4.3. Comment 
Although from the presentation of the aforementioned cases no cle-
ar patterns can be seen, we can observe a more lenient approach of the 
Court towards the Member States’ tax systems, in particular in compari-
son to the early years. This more lenient approach is expressed through 
the Court’s maintenance of the comparability test, inherent in the esta-
blishment of discrimination, in order to find unequal treatment and thus 
a ‘discriminatory restriction’. Thus, not all tax measures can be swept 
under an ‘all-encompassing market access test’. 
The comparability test is in most cases assessed under the aim 
of the measure test124 and despite the settled case law that residents 
and non-residents are not in comparable situations, in recent cases the 
Court seems to adhere to a much more ‘instrumental use’ of a new com-
parability test according to which 
once a Member State, unilaterally or by way of a convention, imposes 
a charge to income tax not only on resident shareholders but also on 
non resident shareholders in respect of dividends which they receive 
from a resident company, the position of those non-resident sharehol-
ders becomes comparable to that of resident shareholders.125 
Under the ‘new comparability test’,126 the Court seems to attempt 
an allocation of taxing competences between the Member States, an issue 
123 ibid para 56.
124 See Metallgesellschaft and Others (n 43) para 60; Case C-231/05 Oy AA [2007] ECR 
I-6373, para 38; Orange European Smallcap Fund (n 48).
125 Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha (n 48) para 43.
126 With regard to the possibility of two situations being comparable ‘as long as (cc the 
subjects/objects at issue) are subject to tax’, see also Test Claimants in the FII Group Litiga-
tion (n 116) and Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen (n 48) para 59: 
‘[...] the situation of a corporate shareholder receiving foreign-sourced dividends is compa-
rable to that of a corporate shareholder receiving nationally-sourced dividends in so far as, 
in each case, the profits made are, in principle, liable to be subject to a series of charges to 
tax. With regard to the possibility of two situations being comparable “as long as (cc they 
are) subject to tax”’.
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that resembles to a great extent the justification accepted by the Court, 
in various cases, of the balanced allocation of taxing powers. 
With reference to relief from double taxation – and the choice of the 
(most) compatible with EU law, the relief method – the CJEU has persi-
sted in trying to allocate taxing powers between Member States in the 
context of economic double taxation so as to ensure that economic dou-
ble taxation is eliminated by one of the states, while it keeps renouncing 
such competence with respect to juridical double taxation.127  As such, 
the Court seems to adopt – to a much larger extent than before – the per 
country approach, in particular with regard to juridical double taxation, 
whereby the restriction at issue is not caught by the four freedoms if the 
difference in treatment does not stem from one Member State’s legislati-
on.128 
At the same time, the resurrection and the more frequent use of the 
fiscal cohesion principle,129 as well as the clarification that the justificati-
ons of the balanced allocation of taxing powers, the risk of tax avoidance 
and the danger of double dip can be advanced separately,130 seem to pro-
vide governments with more opportunities to justify the ‘discriminatory 
restrictions’ arising from their tax systems. 
The last part of the analysis, the two-pronged proportionality test, 
leaves the Court with too much room for manoeuvring. The rejection of 
less restrictive measures like the deduction recapture rule in the X Hol-
ding judgment131 shows first that the Court can easily direct via the pro-
portionality test the outcome of the judgment and that, occasionally, it 
does not trust the exchange of information mechanisms, like the Mutual 
Assistance Directive,132 between the Member States. 
In view of the lack of clarity and often the inconsistency of the 
judgments in this area, the legal reasoning employed by the Court 
seems to be ‘adjustable’ in accordance with the desirable outcomes of 
the judgment. From an outcomes’ perspective, the CJEU’s decisions can 
127 See Englisch (n 45) 214 and the references listed therein. See also Haribo Lakritzen Hans 
Riegel and Österreichische Salinen (n 48). 
128 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt (n 49); Haribo Lakritzen Hans 
Riegel and Österreichische Salinen (n 48). 
129 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt (n 49); Test Claimants in the FII 
Group Litigation (n 115).
130 These three justifications comprised the three pack of successful justifications in the 
Marks and Spencer case (n 6), but as specified by the Court in this case ‘when taken to-
gether’.
131 Similarly Lidl Belgium (n 49).
132 Council Directive (EU) 2011/16 of 15 February 2011 on the administrative cooperation 
in the field of taxation and repealing Council Directive (EEC) 77/799 of 19 December 1977 
on the mutual assistance by the competent authorities of Member States in the field of di-
rect taxation and taxation of insurance premiums.
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have tremendous implications not only directly for the integrity of the 
budget but also for the recovery of taxes by the Member States. In a fra-
mework where cross-border mobility is enhanced, besides the national 
tax administrations’ tasks to monitor the collection of taxes, the Court 
can also have a say as to how much ‘space’ is allowed to the Member 
States to collect their taxes. 
A very important parameter in the recovery of taxes, and a safegu-
ard against tax evasion, is the possibility of the withholding tax raised 
in the source state (where the income arises) and later passed on to the 
‘residence state’ where the beneficial owner of the income/capital at issue 
resides. Withholding taxes guarantee that the income of residents ari-
sing in another Member State will eventually be made subject to effective 
taxation in accordance with the laws of the ‘residence’ Member State. 
As such, withholding taxes function as rules assisting in the recovery of 
taxes in transnational situations.
The dividends taxation case law as presented here points in the di-
rection that (resident) Member States are not allowed much leeway in 
their recovery of taxes.133
Similarly, by reference to the ‘group losses’ regime, when Member 
States are forced to  recognise the right for a consolidation of the trans-
national losses within an EU group, in certain circumstances134 the re-
venue consequences of this extension can be of paramount importance, 
directly impinging upon the national budgets. 
All in all, no tremendous change – in comparison to the post-2005 
case law – can be identified in the Court’s legal reasoning and in the 
outcomes of the cases. In none of the aforementioned cases has the risk 
of serious economic repercussions and budgetary disturbances been bro-
ught forward, so it remains unclear whether the Court has been affected 
by economic considerations in the cases where it found the national me-
asures compatible with EU law. 
A simple observation of the outcomes of these judgments shows that 
out of the 10 cases briefly assessed, 3 cases were ‘won’ by the Member 
States, 6 were lost and one remains to be decided by the national courts. 
While these data are certainly not conclusive, they are enough to demon-
strate that the Court has not returned to the pre-2005 era. It is, at the 
same time, noteworthy that none of the analysed cases dealt with tax 
measures introduced because of or as a result of the crisis, a fact that 
could have potentially triggered different outcomes in the judgments. The 
133 Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha (n 48); Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 
116); Case C-168/11 Beker [2013] (nyr).
134 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt (n 49); X Holding (n 65).
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positive stance towards the Member States’ tax sovereignty (and budgets) 
remains and is most often expressed in the application of the more refi-
ned non-discrimination approach and in the ‘broadening’ of the justifi-
cations scope. 
5. Budgetary concerns and the CJEU’s case law in light of the finan-
cial crisis 
Another way the Court could be more ‘lenient’ towards the Mem-
ber States would be by employing the mechanism of the limitation of 
the temporal effects of a judgment.135 The current crisis, together with 
the tremendous budgetary implications a direct taxation judgment might 
have for the Member States, would call for a broader interpretation of the 
limitation of temporal effects in the more recent judgments, and in parti-
cular with regard to the Member States most affected by the crisis. Thus, 
on the one hand, the possibility of making the retrospective effect of the 
Court’s tax decisions conditional upon their budgetary consequences wo-
uld promote efficiency and the rule of law, but on the other hand it would 
risk rendering the Court a political and policy making institution, guided 
by economic considerations. 
The limitation of the temporal effects of a judgment has been a very 
useful tool, albeit of limited application in the case law of the CJEU. It 
can be considered as an apparatus in the hands of the judges that allows 
them to deliver politically and economically acceptable solutions without 
the risk of traumatising the integrity of the judicial outcome. While the 
retroactivity of the Court’s judgments is a general rule,136 the limitation 
of the temporal effects of the judgment was developed by the Court as a 
political choice, since the Treaties do not provide for a legal basis for such 
an action. The Court set out for the first time the criteria for the granting 
of this limitation in 1976, in Defrenne,137 a case on the equal salaries of 
men and women.
135 See Case C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona [2006] ECR I-9373, Opinion of AG Jaco-
bs, 74; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para 52; Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] 
ECR I-2119, para 68.
136 Case 61/79 Denkavit italiana [1980] ECR 1205, para 16; Case C-66/79 Salumi [1980] 
ECR 1237, para 9; Case C- 294/99 Athinaiki Zythopoiia AE [2001] ECR I-6797, para 35; 
Case C-209/03 Dany Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119, para 66:  ‘It is settled case-law that the 
interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 234 EC, 
the Court of Justice gives to a rule of Community law clarifies and defines where necessary 
the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be or ought to have been understood and 
applied from the time of its entry into force. It follows that the rule as thus interpreted may, 
and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships arising and established before 
the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the 
conditions enabling an action relating to the application of that rule to be brought before 
the courts having jurisdiction are satisfied’.
137 Case C-43/75 Defrenne v Sabena  (Defrenne II) [1976] ECR 455.
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The Court has repeatedly held that it is only in exceptional cases 
that the effects of a judgment on a request for interpretation may be limi-
ted. Such a step may be taken, the Court argues, only in certain specific 
circumstances, for instance where 
there is a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular 
to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith 
on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force, and where it 
appears that both individuals and national authorities have been 
prompted to adopt practices which do not comply with Community 
law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the im-
plications of Community provisions, to which the conduct of other 
Member States or the Commission may even have contributed.138 
In subsequent judgments the Court clarified that two criteria must 
be (cumulatively) satisfied for the limitation of temporal effects to apply: 
the State (and/or private parties) must have acted in good faith that their 
measures at issue did not violate EU law and that there is a ‘risk of se-
rious difficulties’.139
With the exception of the enhancement of legal certainty and pre-
dictability, the ‘prospective overruling’ of the CJEU’s cases certainly has its 
shortcomings. On the one hand, it allows the Member States to maintain 
‘discriminatory’ or ‘restrictive’ laws since the budgetary risk if they get ‘ca-
ught’ will be minimal. In addition, as AG Saggio has observed, non-retroac-
tivity on account of the extent of the financial repercussions on Member 
States would have the paradoxical consequence of treating the most serio-
us infringements more favourably than those of a less serious nature, the 
former being obviously those which are likely to have the most significant 
financial implications for Member States.140 Finally, prospective overruling 
could be considered as incompatible with the judicial role itself, which is to 
state what the law is and not to prescribe what it shall be.141
Since the purpose of this subsection is not to analyse the limitation 
of temporal effects in general, but to research how the budgetary impli-
138  Joined Cases C-197/94 and C-252/94 Bautiaa [1996] ECR I-505, para 38.
139 See Case C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona [2006] ECR I-9373, Opinion of AG Ja-
cobs, 74; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para 52; Case C-209/03 Bidar 
[2005] ECR I-2119, para 68; Case C-57/93 Vroege [1994] ECR I-4541, para 21: ‘Exception-
ally, however, having regard to the need for legal certainty, the Court may limit the pos-
sibility for parties to rely on the interpretation in such a judgment to call in question legal 
relations established in good faith in the past.  Before deciding to impose such a limitation, 
it verifies that two essential criteria are fulfilled, namely that those concerned should have 
acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties’ (emphasis added).
140 Case C-437/97 Evangelischer Krankenhausverein Wien (EKW)  v Abgabenberufungskom-
mission Wien [2000] ECR I-1157, Opinion of AG Saggio, para 65.
141 US Supreme Court Justice Scalia cited in Jill Fisch, ‘Retroactivity and Legal Change: An 
Equilibrium Approach’ [1997] 110 Harvard Law Review 1055.
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cations of the Court’s judgments might have an impact on the Court’s 
choices, we will focus more on the latter criterion and less on the element 
of ‘good faith’. 
As a starting point, it is evident that the economic consequences 
and the result of ‘a risk of serious difficulties’ differ from Member State 
to Member State. Since the CJEU is willing to limit the temporal effects 
of a judgment only if its economic repercussions are severe for the Mem-
ber State at issue, an ad hoc analysis considering the public financial 
condition of each Member State at issue is necessary,142 and no ‘one size 
fits all’ approach can apply. The limited territorial effects the limitation of 
retrospectivity can have for other Member States has been confirmed by 
AG Stix-Hackl in her opinion in Banca Popolare di Cremona.143
Despite the view confirmed in settled case law that the Court cannot 
accept the loss of tax revenue as a justification for a restrictive (or dis-
criminatory) measure,144 there is evidence that the CJEU is aware of the 
pressure its decisions might have on national budgets. In the excise duti-
es EKW case,145 the amount at stake was estimated to be the equivalent of 
€1.6 billion. Although AG Saggio argued that taking budgetary consequ-
ences into account would reduce the Court’s competence in tax matters 
to trivial issues,146 the Court decided otherwise. It accepted the Austrian 
government’s good faith, while it indirectly translated the budgetary ar-
gument as a ‘serious difficulty’: 
142 Michael Lang, ‘Limitation of the Temporal Effects of Judgments of the ECJ’ (2007) 35 
Intertax 230, 237.
143 Case C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona [2006] ECR I-9373, Opinion of AG Stix-
Hackl, 179ff: ‘If a temporal limitation is imposed on the effect of such a ruling, it will be in 
the interest of the Member State concerned, in order to avoid exceptional disruption. If there 
is an exception to the limitation it will be granted, by contrast, in the interests of those who, 
within the Member State, have sought to assert claims in reliance on Community law. Yet a 
ruling on interpretation has general effect. If the Court rules that a tax having the charac-
teristics of IRAP as described by the referring court is incompatible with the Sixth Directive, 
that will be true for IRAP and equally true for any other tax having those characteristics in 
any other Member State. However, any temporal limitation and any exception thereto deci-
ded upon by the Court will be based on an assessment of the situation – existence of good 
faith on the part of the State, risk of serious disruption for the State and need for effective 
judicial protection of diligent claimants – in Italy, and that assessment might be quite diffe-
rent with regard to another Member State which also applied a tax having the same characte-
ristics. That consideration implies that any limitation should be not only temporal but also, in 
effect, spatial – a point of some relevance in the present case since it appears from several of 
the numerous articles which have already appeared in legal and tax journals concerning this 
case that one or more Member States other than Italy may apply taxes which, at least in the 
opinion of some authors, share certain characteristics with IRAP’ (emphasis added).
144 Case Verkooijen (n 43) para 59; Case Manninen (n 41) para 49.
145 EKW and Wein & Co (n 140).
146 EKW and Wein & Co (n 140) Opinion of AG Saggio, para 65.
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In those circumstances, and without there being any need to consider 
the global amount in question, the absence of proof of payment or the 
very large number of small transactions concerning small amounts, 
overriding grounds of legal certainty preclude calling in question le-
gal relations which have exhausted their effects in the past; to do so 
would retroactively cast into confusion the system whereby Austrian 
municipalities are financed.147. 
The likely confusion148 and the administrative burden that might 
arise from the many repayments the Austrian state would have to make 
seem too weak to justify (alone) the Court’s decision. Hence, it seems 
unconvincing that the Court reached this decision while ignoring the tre-
mendous amount at stake. 
The order to reopen the oral procedure, including the delivery of a 
new Advocate General’s opinion in two key tax cases149 where the amou-
nts of refund at stake could be enormous, also tells of the Court’s stance 
towards the budgetary implications of its judgments.150  The first case, 
Banca Popolare di Cremona,151 concerned an indirect tax measure, which, 
if found incompatible with EU law, would have cost the Italian government 
€120 billion.152 Thus, it is not by chance that the case – decided in the 
Grand Chamber – attracted 15 (!) intervening Member States.
In the first opinion, issued in March 2005, AG Jacobs acknowledged 
the difficulty of deciding on the limitation of the temporal effects of the 
judgment, as well as its extent.153 In the second opinion delivered on this 
case, AG Stix-Hackl acknowledged the need for a ‘nuanced’ limitation of 
the temporal effects of this judgment and thus, proposed:  
147 EKW and Wein & Co (n 140) para 59 (emphasis added).
148 The confusion criterion was also used in Case C-262/96 Sürül v Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit 
[1999] ECR I-2685, where, the Court found that the retrospective application of its decision 
would ‘retroactively throw the financing of the social security systems of the Member Sta-
tes into confusion’ (para111), thus accepting the point raised by Member States that the 
effect of a retrospective judgment ‘would be such as to undermine a large number of legal 
relationships established on the basis of national legislation which has been in force for 
some time and to have serious financial repercussions for the social security systems of the 
Member States’ (para 106).
149 Case C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona [2006] ECR I-9373 and Case C-292/04 Mei-
licke and Others [2007] ECR I-1835.
150 M O’Brien, ‘Direct Taxation, the ECJ and Implications for Member State Budgets’ in A 
Verdun (ed), Political and Economic Consequences of Economic and Monetary Union: Taking 
Stock of the First Eight Years (Nova Science Publishers Inc 2007) 208.
151 Banca popolare di Cremona (n 149).
152 ibid para 72. 
153 Banca Popolare di Cremona v Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Cremona (n 149) Opinion of AG 
Jacobs, para 87: ‘In view of the difficulties involved in choosing the appropriate limitation, 
it may be desirable for the Court to reopen the oral procedure to hear further argument on 
that point’.
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The prohibition in that article may not be relied upon in order to 
claim reimbursement of IRAP levied in respect of any period of asse-
ssment prior to the Court’s judgment, or in respect of the period 
during which that judgment is delivered, except by persons who ini-
tiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent administrative claim 
before 17 March 2005, the date on which Advocate General Jacobs 
delivered his Opinion in the present case. Such claimants may rely 
on it to the extent that their claims are not otherwise barred by na-
tional procedural rules which observe the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness.154 
The Court, in its turn, found that the measure at issue was compa-
tible with Article 33 of the 6th VAT Directive, and hence it did not touch 
upon the question of the limitation of the temporal effects.
In the Meilicke case,155 Germany’s tax refund liability was estimated 
at €5 million.156 In the first opinion AG Tizzano delivered in November 
2005, he suggested that the judgment should have effect from the date 
the CJEU ruled in Verkooijen,157 as that was the time when the stance of 
EU law towards dividend taxation became clear, implying that until then 
Germany was acting in good faith.158 
In the second opinion in the Meilicke case, AG Stix-Hackl conside-
red that Germany did not provide for sufficient evidence of the risk of 
serious economic repercussions,159 whereas it was also suggested that 
Germany was not acting in good faith while denying cross-border relief 
for EU dividends, in particular after the judgments in the Verkooijen and 
Manninen cases.160  The AG, along the lines of the reasoning of AG Saggio, 
noted that in the absence of a de minimis rule, a clear (quantifiable) test 
154 Banca Popolare di Cremona v Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Cremona (n 149) Opinion AG Stix-
Hackl, para187. 
155 Meilicke and Others (n 149)
156 This was the estimation of the German government in the first hearing. During the sec-
ond hearing the German government attempted unsuccessfully to exaggerate this amount. 
157 Verkooijen (n 43).
158 Meilicke and Others (n 149) Opinion of AG Tizzano, para 47: ‘It should be noted that, 
with regard to a limitation on the temporal effect of a judgment, “the Court has consistently 
held [that] such a restriction may be allowed only in the actual judgment ruling upon the 
interpretation sought”. However, that would not apply in the present case since, as I have 
pointed out more than once, the interpretation of the Community rules from which it fol-
lows that the German legislation at issue in the present case is unlawful is based essentially 
on the judgment in Verkooijen and a limitation of the temporal effect of that judgment was 
neither requested nor automatically granted.’
159 Meilicke and Others (n 149) Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl, para 57ff.
160 ibid para 45ff.
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should not be encouraged,161 a view that was endorsed in literature.162 
The Court, however, missed the opportunity to elaborate further on the 
degree of the severity of the financial repercussions and the possible bud-
getary implications and their relation to the granting of ‘prospectivity’. 
In a rather short and unsatisfactory part of the judgment, it rejected the 
plea for a limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment, by referring 
to the Verkooijen163 and Manninen164 cases. It noted that the requirements 
arising from the free movement of capital in respect of dividends recei-
ved by residents from non-resident companies were clarified in the two 
aforementioned judgments,165 thus implicitly excluding the possibility of 
Germany acting in good faith after these two cases were decided, while it 
added that the Court did not limit the temporal effects in these previous 
judgments either.166 
The opinion of AG Stix-Hackl had been preceded by the opinion of 
AG Geelhoed in April 2006 in the Test Claimants FII case.167 The latter 
also adopted a more moderate approach towards the granting of prospec-
tivity, as requested by the UK during the oral submissions. The plea was 
rejected on the basis that it was insufficiently substantiated. The Advoca-
te General pointed to another ‘thorn’ in the granting of limitation of tem-
poral effects, the often inaccurate estimation of the economic damages. 
The mere reference to the ‘catastrophic consequences of a judgment’ is 
not, therefore, sufficient, and specific proof should be provided with re-
gard to the budgetary consequences in order to substantiate the plea for 
prospectivity. AG Geelhoed noted that although the figure at stake was 
put at £7 billion by the defendant, the UK Government ‘gave no indicati-
on of how it arrived at this figure’.168 The same cautious approach169 was 
161 ibid para 60: ‘The risk of serious economic repercussions may not be established solely 
by reference to figures, but requires an assessment by the Court based upon the submis-
sions of facts of the Member State which made the application. Accordingly, in my view, the 
Court should resist the temptation to link the degree of severity of the financial repercussions 
to the level of the possible financial consequences or specific sums of money. Even taking into 
account the varying economic strength of the various Member States, I think it is danger-
ous to proceed in the long term on the basis that specific (even if large) amounts of money 
imply a risk of serious economic repercussions from the outset. This would seem to me to 
be putting the cart before the horse and could even, in the worst case scenario, lead to a 
“threshold value discussion”’ (emphasis added).
162 Otmar Thömmes, ‘European Legal Order with no Mercy for Member States’ Budget Con-
cerns’ (2007) 35 Editorial Intertax 3; Lang (n 142) 230.  
163 Verkooijen (n 43).
164 Manninen (n 41).
165 Meilicke and Others (n 149) para 40. 
166 ibid paras 37-39.
167 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 8).
168 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (n 8), Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 144.
169 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation (n 34), Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 112: 
‘In any event, as I observed in my Opinion in the FII case, it is for the UK, when raising a 
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applied in the Thin Cap Group Litigation,170 a group relief case where the 
sum at issue was estimated at €300 million, but no evidence was provi-
ded as to how the UK government reached this estimation. 
It follows that so far the Court seems to adopt a rather moderate 
approach with regard to the limitation of temporal effects. In cases where 
the amounts at stake were particularly large, exceeding €1 billion, the 
Court either abstained from issuing an opinion, as it found the measu-
re at issue compatible with EU Law (Banca Popolare di Cremona171), or 
granted the limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment (the EKW 
case).172 The FII and Test Claimants cases cannot be indicative, as the de-
cision of the Court not to grant prospectivity was based to a large extent 
on the absence of any proof as to the exact damage the decision would 
cause and the insufficient substantiation of the case by the defendants. 
This moderate approach that the Court has traditionally had is also 
reflected in its most recent, post-crisis, judgments.173 Nevertheless, the 
need for the Court to perceive budgetary difficulties as a separate ground 
for a prospective ruling on reasons of economic efficiency has been sugge-
sted in literature,174 on grounds that a potentially severe budgetary impact 
would affect not only the Member State as such, but also its citizens and 
its social policies,175 and would possibly result in an increased tax rate to 
cover for the loss, or a ‘new tax’ or even reduced public services. 
In view of the above, it would be reasonable to demand the use of 
budgetary difficulties as a separate ground for justifying the limitation of 
plea of temporal limitation, to ensure that the Court has before it sufficient information to 
allow it to come to a judgment on the issue. For similar reasons as I enunciated in that case 
– in which the UK also raised the issue of temporal limitation solely at the oral stage of the 
procedure, without indicating how it arrived at its estimate of the cost of the case, or giving 
argument as to the proposed cut-off date for the effects of the judgment – the Court should 
dismiss the plea.’
170 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation (n 34).
171 Banca Popolare di Cremona v Agenzia Entrate Ufficio Cremona (n 149)
172 EKW and Wein & Co (n 140).
173 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para 52; Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR 
I-2119, para 68; and Case C-2/09 Kalinchev [2010] ECR I-4939 para 52; Case C-387/11 
European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium [2012] (nyr); Joined Cases C-338/11 to 
C-347/11 Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others [2012] ECR I-0000, para 61, 
where the Court held that: ‘As regards the French Government’s reference to the far-reach-
ing budgetary consequences of the Court’s present judgment, it is settled case-law that the 
financial consequences which might ensue for a Member State from a preliminary ruling do 
not in themselves justify limiting the temporal effects of the ruling’.
174 Henk Vording and Allard Lubbers, ‘The ECJ, Retrospectivity and the Member States’ Tax 
Revenues’ (2006) British Tax Review 91, 107. 
175 The day AG Stix-Hackl submitted her opinion to the Court on the Meilicke case (n 149) 
the German government issued a press release stating that the opinion ran counter to all 
‘Sachverstand’, was ‘completely incomprehensible and in violation of the fundamental in-
terests of a Member State and its citizens’.
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the temporal effects of the judgment, all the more so in times of economic 
crises, where the need for budgetary stability, discipline and compliance 
with the targets is essential not only for one Member State, but also for 
the future of the Euro zone and the Euro as a whole. Effectively, such 
a suggestion would not disturb the legal reasoning of the Court, as the 
outcome of the case would remain unchanged: the Court would reach 
exactly the same conclusion regardless of the prospectivity claim; it wo-
uld, however, grant the limitation of temporal effects to Member States 
capable of proving that a retrospective judgment would seriously under-
mine their budgetary soundness. 
The downside of the straightforward acceptance of the budgetary 
difficulties argument is primarily that, with a lack of clear estimations, 
the amount of tax revenues at stake can be easily exaggerated by the 
Member States concerned.176 This peril, in addition to the absence of a 
de minimis rule, would make this already political and economic choi-
ce of the Court even more political, unpredictable and uncertain: what 
amount would be sufficient and necessary to ‘undermine the budgetary’ 
soundness of a Member State, and who would assess it? With a lack of 
precise quantifications and of a specific test, one could argue that the 
burden of granting prospectivity would inevitably fall on the good faith of 
the Member State which would prevent a ‘cheating’ Member State from 
benefiting from this tool.177 Such a solution would not provide, however, 
for a more ‘robust’ legal framework, as good faith is difficult to (dis)prove 
in such case law that is inconsistent and lacking in legal certainty. Thus, 
in view of the legal uncertainty, unpredictability and inconsistency of the 
direct tax case law, as demonstrated under section 4, it is submitted that 
in many ‘unclear’ or ‘even contradictory’ areas, the ‘good faith’ compo-
nent of the limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment should be 
assumed by the Court. Such a development would (re-)shift the burden 
for the granting of prospectivity back to the financial repercussions of the 
judgment. 
Evidently, the Court would de facto be obliged to make political and 
policy choices and it is my view that in the crisis context, these choices 
should be as lenient as possible for the budgets of the Member States. Li-
miting the judgment’s retroactivity on grounds of serious budgetary diffi-
culties, on the assumption of good faith, would, in addition, protect the 
other taxpayers against arbitrary tax increases which would be necessary 
to remedy the budgetary deficit caused by CJEU judgments involving 
huge tax revenue if retroactivity was not limited.
176 See also Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation (n 34) and Test Claimants in the 
FII Group Litigation (n 8).
177 See Meilicke (n 149).
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The Court has so far only vaguely provided for the groundwork for 
such a ‘justification’ of prospectivity to apply. An analysis of the tax cases 
decided by the Court since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 shows that 
there have been only eleven judgments on taxation (direct, indirect, cu-
stoms and excise duties) whereby the Member States at issue applied for 
a limitation of the temporal effects of the judgments.178 Six of them were 
related to VAT and excise duties issues. The application for prospectivity 
was rejected in five of them, but in the Marks and Spencer (II) case,179 de-
cided in April 2008, the Court ruled that it was for the national court to 
decide whether such a limitation would apply. By contrast, in the three 
direct taxation cases180 that revolved around income and property taxati-
on, dividend taxation and withholding taxes, as well as the interpretation 
of the parent-subsidiary Directive, the Court did not grant the limitation. 
The Court cannot be entirely blamed for not granting this limitati-
on despite the financial crisis context. The unexpected scarcity of pros-
pectivity claims by the Member States, the aforementioned dangers of 
the exaggeration of the amounts at stake, the risk of abusive claims of 
prospectivity, as well as the last minute advancement of the request (du-
ring the hearing) have been identified in the Court’s recent case law in 
taxation. Although the Court seems to be prepared to accept that the 
limitation of temporal effects can apply also to judgments initiated under 
the infringement procedure,181 it finds the simple quantification of the 
amounts at stake insufficient,182 while it considers of utmost importance 
the demonstration of a risk of serious economic repercussions if the limi-
tation is not granted. 
178 Case C-525/11 Mednis [2012] ECR I-0000; Case C-263/11 Rēdlihs [2012] ECR I-0000; 
Case C-2/09 Kalinchev [2010] ECR I-4939; Case C-138/07 Cobelfret [2009] ECR 1-731; 
Joined Cases C-95/07 and C-96/07 Ecotrade [2008]; Case C-309/06 Marks & Spencer 
II [2008] ECR I-2283.
179 In Marks and Spencer II (n 178) para 60: ‘It is for the national court itself to draw any 
conclusions with respect to the past from the infringement of the principle of equal treat-
ment referred to in point 3 of the operative part of this judgment, in accordance with the 
rules relating to the temporal effects of the national legislation applicable in the main pro-
ceedings, in compliance with Community law and, in particular, with the principle of equal 
treatment and the principle that it must ensure that the remedies which it grants are not 
contrary to Community law.’
180 Cobelfret (n 178); Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others (n 173), where the 
limitation was not granted because the French government, which requested only at the 
hearing that the temporal effects of the present judgment be limited, failed to put forward 
any data at the hearing). Similarly in European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium (n 173).
181 European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium (n 173) para 90: ‘[…] Even if judgments 
delivered under Article 258 TFEU were to have the same effects as those delivered under 
Article 267 TFEU and considerations of legal certainty might make it necessary, exception-
ally, to limit their temporal effects provided that the conditions laid down by the Court’s 
case-law in the context of Article 267 TFEU are met’.
182 ibid para 91. 
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6. Decrease in the number of references for a preliminary ruling?
A potential redemption possibility for the Member States’ budgets 
would be a decrease in references for preliminary rulings sent to the 
CJEU. Times of crisis, the need for new implementing measures, as well 
as the commitment to transpose all the new economic governance legal 
framework are likely to alter the balanced collaboration and construc-
tive dialogue between the national judge and the CJEU. A very ‘active’ 
interpretation by the Court that would strike down national tax systems, 
such as the one observed in the ‘middle’ years, could lead to an implicit 
‘boycotting’ of the CJEU by the national referring Courts.183 The often 
enormous budgetary implications of tax judgments and a possibly nega-
tive approach of the Court towards national tax systems could deter the 
national Courts from sending references for preliminary rulings to the 
CJEU and would lead to the (most convenient)  interpretation of EU law 
by them.184 Additionally, given the fundamental issues of sovereignty that 
tax measures generally deal with, we expect a decrease in the number 
of references for a preliminary ruling sent by the national courts to the 
CJEU, with the consequence of the empowering of the national judge over 
the Community judge. 
Such conduct would be further enhanced in view of the considerable 
importance the acte clair doctrine has acquired as a way whereby the na-
tional court can avoid making references to the Court of Justice,185 either 
by adopting a liberal approach to the application of the CILFIT conditions 
or by adhering to a flexible margin of appreciation made possible under 
the acte clair doctrine. 
General data from the Court of Justice point nevertheless to a ste-
ady increase in references for preliminary rulings, as the following table 
shows:186
183 Michael Graetz and Alvin C Warren Jr, ‘Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and 
Economic Integration of Europe’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1186. 
184 Case 283/81 CILFIT and Others [1982] ECR 3415. The Court established in the CILFIT 
case the acte clair doctrine according to which a court or tribunal against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of Community 
law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice, unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the Commu-
nity provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct 
application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt 
(para 21). See also Case C-495/03 Intennodal Transports [2005] ECR I-0000, para 33. 
185 Niels Fenger and Morten P Broberg, ‘Finding Light in the Darkness: On the Actual Ap-
plication of the Acte Clair Doctrine (2011) 30 Yearbook of European Law 180. 
186 Data from the CJEU, Annual Report 2012, Luxembourg 2013 
 h t t p : / / c u r i a . e u r o p a . e u / j c m s / u p l o a d / d o c s / a p p l i c a t i o n / p d f / 2 0 1 3 -
04/192685_2012_6020_cdj_ra_2012_en_proof_01.pdf> accessed 11 December 2013. The 
insignificant decrease observed in 2012 is proportionate to the overall decrease of new cases 
brought before the Court. 
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
New cases under the procedure of 
references for preliminary rulings 
(Art 267 TFEU)
288 302 385 423 404
TOTAL number of new cases 
(regardless of the procedure)
593 562 631 688 632
While this also holds true for the direct taxation cases, most of which 
reach the Court under the 267 TFEU procedure, it is interesting to exa-
mine whether this also applies to a) Member States such as Ireland and 
Cyprus which place particular weight on their tax systems to attract in-
vestment and establishment; b) Member States which maintain very ‘fra-
gile’ budgets because of the crisis. 
With regard to the first case, Ireland and Cyprus constitute (together 
with Estonia) the countries with the lowest corporate tax rates in the EU. 
Not only do they thus represent the two leading examples in tax competi-
tion but they also form two prominent examples of a lack of balanced ju-
dicial cooperation in taxation. Ireland and Cyprus have thus never so far 
sent a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court, although they have 
‘suffered’ a lot from infringement proceedings initiated by the Commissi-
on. The example of these two states famous for their taxpayer-friendly tax 
systems tells of the reluctance of Member States that use taxation as a 
main ‘bait’ to attract investment and establishment to resort to the CJEU 
to ensure that their tax systems are compatible with EU law. 
With reference to the second category, I consider the Member Sta-
tes most affected by the crisis the PIGS countries or, put differently, the 
Member States that resorted to the financial assistance mechanisms so 
as not to default.187 Although not all these Member States requested fi-
nancial assistance at the same time, the time framework of the last 5 
years seems accurate with respect to the outbreak of the economic cri-
sis. Judging from the high number of ‘lost’ cases for the Member States 
in the recent past, it can be expected that the number of references for 
preliminary rulings in tax matters from the financially distressed states 
will decrease. 
In order to examine whether the crisis and the ‘fragile’ budgets have 
deterred the Member States most affected by the crisis to send references 
for preliminary rulings to the CJEU, we compare the number of referen-
ces sent by the PIGS countries (with regard to taxation, both direct and 
indirect) in the last 5 years, as well as in the period between October 
187 Cyprus is intentionally left out because of its very recent inclusion in the list of the ‘fi-
nancially assisted’ Member States. 
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2003 and October 2008 (the 5 years previous to the crisis). The findin-
gs of this comparison demonstrate that we cannot observe any major 
changes in the number of references sent in the last 5 years and in the 5 
years previous to them. Thus, estimations show that in the last 5 years, 
Portugal has sent to the CJEU 7 references for preliminary rulings,188 
Spain has sent 8 references for preliminary rulings with regard to both 
direct and indirect taxation,189 whereas Greece has not sent any. With the 
exception of Greece, which had sent 3 references for preliminary rulings 
(all on VAT issues) in the period from 2003 to 2008, data from Portugal 
and Spain for that period demonstrate that the former had sent 5 refe-
rences for preliminary rulings (3 on VAT, one on indirect taxation and one 
on corporate taxation), whereas Spain had sent 2, both on VAT matters. 
While the numbers cannot provide any conclusive evidence of Greece’s 
potential change of stance towards judicial cooperation and the need to 
safeguard national budgets, the overall trend drawn from the examples 
of Portugal and Spain seems to safely allow the conclusion that there has 
been a sharp decrease in the number of preliminary rulings for the P(I)
(G)S countries. 
Overall, it cannot be concluded that because of the financial crisis 
the balanced collaboration and constructive dialogue between the nati-
onal judge and the CJEU has altered. National courts continue sending 
references for preliminary rulings even in an area as ‘dangerous’ for the 
national budgets as direct taxation. A possible contribution to this has 
been the positive shift of the Court towards a more respectful approach 
to the national tax systems, as well as the persistent complexity of the 
area that necessitates such a stance by the Court. In contrast, countries, 
notably Ireland and Cyprus, whose economy is heavily based on the tax 
incentives they provide, have always refrained from putting in jeopardy 
their tax systems. On these grounds, the crisis clearly has not had any 
implications for these Member States.   
188 Case C-282/12 Itelcar – Automóveis de Aluguer Lda v Fazenda Pública [2013] (nyr) (on 
corporate taxation); Case C-38/11 Amorim Energia [2012] OJ C130; Case C-496/11 Portu-
gal Telecom [2012] ECR I-0000 (on VAT); Case C-25/11 Varzim Sol [2012] ECR I-0000 (on 
VAT); Case C-126/10 Foggia – SGPS [2011] ECR I-0000 (on mergers’ taxation); C-106/10 
Lidl & Companhia v Fazenda Pública [2011] ECR I-0000 (on VAT).
189   Case C-125/12 Promociones y Construcciones BJ 200 SL [2013] (nyr) (on 
VAT); Case C-377/11 International Bingo Technology SA [2012] ECR I-0000  (on 
VAT); Case C-285/10 Campsa Estaciones de Servicio [2011] ECR I-0000 (on VAT); 
Case C-157/10 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria [2011] ECR I-0000 (on corporate taxa-
tion); Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales [2010] ECR I-635 (on 
VAT); Case C-487/09 Inmogolf SA [2010] (on indirect taxes); and Joined Cases C-428/06 to 
C-434/06 UGT-Rioja and Others [2008] ECR I-6747 (on fiscal aid); Case C-151/08 Renta 
[2008] OJ C150 (on VAT).
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7. Conclusion 
The financial/sovereign debt crisis does not seem to have affected 
either the Court’s legal reasoning or the outcomes of the judgments. The 
Court, along the pattern established in 2005, follows a friendlier approach 
towards the Member States’ budgets, in particular in comparison to the 
early years; its case law, however, remains fragmented and its reasoning 
susceptible to instrumental use. In view of this, the fact that in most 
cases Member States’ national tax measures are still found incompatible 
with the four freedoms demonstrates that the Court is very little affected 
by economic considerations, even in the light of the crisis.
With reference to the limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment, 
we reach the same conclusion if we consider the ‘crisis’ case law. While 
in earlier cases, where the amounts at stake were particularly large, the 
CJEU seemed to take account of the tremendous budgetary implications 
for the Member States and grant the prospectivity of the ruling, recent 
cases have not revealed such a pressing need. This happens because, 
quite surprisingly, we do not observe an ‘explosion’ of applications for the 
limitation of temporal effects, and in cases where the Member States have 
asked for prospectivity, they have not ‘played’ the limitation of temporal 
effects card correctly. It is advocated that, particularly in such times of 
crisis, and in view of the inconsistent, unpredictable and unclear case 
law, the Court should be more lenient in the granting of prospectivity in 
cases of serious budgetary implications, while the Member States should 
demonstrate the serious economic repercussions and substantiate their 
claims using as proof accurate estimations of the financial impact of the 
judgment. 
Finally, the Member States themselves appear still to trust the 
judgments of the CJEU despite the aforementioned malaises. No decrease 
in the number of references for preliminary rulings in the area of taxation 
can be observed, implying that the Member States are not attempting 
to induce a shift of the Court to a more ‘lenient’ approach towards their 
budgets. As opposed to the 2005 critical juncture, the Member States do 
not want to coerce the Court with political or ‘institutional’ pressure to 
respect more their national tax systems. 
Since this paper has departed from the claim that the CJEU does 
consider the political and economic costs of its decisions, the opposite 
conclusion appears rather surprising. Why has not the Court taken a 
more active stance, similar to the ‘constitutional-making’ principles in 
previous crises to ‘alleviate’ the Member States faced with such a cri-
sis? One potential reason, as this paper has already implied, is that the 
Court has not been particularly incentivised by the Member States to 
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do so.190  Another possible justification for this lack of a ‘jurisprudential 
shift’ could be that the Court has not – so far – been confronted with any 
‘crisis-related’ tax measures. In view of the case law amenable to instru-
mental use, the Court could, arguably, have reacted differently if it had 
had to address a ‘crisis related’ or ‘a crisis induced’ specific tax measure. 
In such a case, the CJEU could show more latitude towards the Member 
States’ budgets so as to endorse the specific intentions of the legislator. 
Finally, the ‘integrative function’ inherent to the Court as reflected in 
both the specific pre-2005 direct taxation case law, as well as the Court’s 
case law in the 1970s, could allow the more general conclusion that the 
Court might not be prepared to repudiate this ‘integrationist’ role it has 
been granted in past decades. Limiting the scope of the application of EU 
law, even when this seems politically and economically acceptable, seems 
much harder to ask for from the ‘integration catalyst’. One should not 
forget, however, that both economic and political integration is eventually 
achieved through the Member States. Taking into account the Member 
States’ interests, in particular in such times of unprecedented crisis, is 
therefore of vital importance in holding the ‘EU construct’ together.
190 This finding is particularly advocated by the steady increase in the number of references 
for preliminary rulings (even in tax matters), as well as the applications for a limitation of 
the temporal effects of the judgment, which have been ‘underplayed’ by the Member States. 
